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Constitutional Limitations on the
Naturalization Power
According to international law, each sovereign nation has, in the
absence of international agreement, absolute discretion in controlling
aliens within its borders.' Similarly, international law imposes no
restrictions on sovereign power in granting citizenship to aliens. There
is no requirement that a state provide for naturalization; and, if it does
make provision, it is free to establish any conditions precedent.
Under the United States Constitution, of course, there are limits on
government power. In a "non-naturalization context," a resident alien
does, generally, have constitutional rights.2 However, with respect to
1. Each nation, under international law, possesses inherent power to bar entry to aliens,
as well as power to restrict their actions or expel them afier entry is granted. Sec 1
C.C. HYDE, INTERNATIONAL LAxw 217 (2d ed. 1945); H. LutrrmwAcirr, AN L, A 'to.%AL
BiLL or Ta RIGHS OF M!AN 124 (1945); E.L BoRcHARD, DirwsrTic PROTELrIo OF CT-
IZENS ABROAD 46 (1915). See also, A.V. FRE m.AN, TnE INT.RNTiO NAL RESPOxsMInT" OF
SrATEs FOR DENiA. OF JusricE 227 (1936).
2. The rights which resident aliens possess in non-naturalization contexts include those
guaranteed by the First and Fifth Amendments. The First Amendment is written in abso-
lute terms; there is no indication in the text that its guarantees of free expression and as-
sociation apply only to citizens. (It must be assumed that the framers of the Constitution
and the Bill of Rights did not want to limit the protection of the First Amendment to
citizens, since when they did so intend they were explicit. See Privileges and Immunities
Clause of art. 4, § 2 and Fourteenth Amendment § 1.) In addition, the "basic theory of
freedom of expression would seem clearly to preclude any special restriction upon free-
dom of expression by aliens." T. I. EmE.RsoN, TOWARD A GENE AL Timony OF Tim Fms?
ArxrD nmErr 101 (1963). First, free expression is essential to the dignity and personal fulfill-
ment of free men, id. at pp. 5-11; and there is no apparent reason why resident aliens, who
constitute a significant segment of the population, should be denied such benefits. Second,
free speech is essential to the successful functioning of representative government. See B.
CARuozo, THm PARADoxES OF LEGAL SciEmcE 104-05 (1928); Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S.
616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting). Elected officials must be informed of the desires of
all who will be subject to the rules which they make, whether or not those subjected are
voters. To hold the contrary would be to assume that lawmakers are uninterested in the
welfare of non-voters, who constitute over half the population. And third, resident aliens
must have the right of free expression as a corollary of the first amendment rights of citi.
zens. To restrict the ability of aliens to communicate would be to limit the variety of
opinions and associations to which citizens have access. See Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v.
FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969); Lamont v. Postmaster General, 381 U.S. 801, 307 (1965); Note, Open-
ing the Floodgates to Dissident Aliens, 6 HARV. Civ. RiGmrs.Cv. Lin. . REv. 141 (1970).
The Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment protects "persons." not merely "cit-
izens." See Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 161 (1945) (concurring opinion); United
States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 228 (1942); Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228. 242,
243 (Field, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (1896); He Chan v. Piod,
178 F. Supp. 793, 797 (N.D. Ill. 1959). In non-alien-oriented contexts, that is, in contexts
other than exclusion, deportation, or naturalization proceedings, it has long been recog-
nized that resident aliens are "persons" within the context of that clause, and are guar-
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naturalization statutes,3 constitutional limitations do not exist. Except
for a procedural due process requirement, the courts have adopted the
international law concept of unfettered sovereign power. As the Su-
preme Court put it in 1931:
Naturalization is a privilege, to be given, qualified, or withheld as
Congress may determine, and which the alien may claim as of
right only upon compliance with the terms which Congress im-
poses. 4
That principle is controlling today.
This Note will argue that normal standards of constitutional ad-
judication should apply in naturalization cases. It will evaluate current
statutory provisions and administrative practices in light of those
standards.
anteed both procedural and "substantive" rights. Procedurally, aliens are entitled to the
same fifth amendment safeguards as are citizens. And substantively, resident aliens are
protected by the Fifth Amendment from government action which is "arbitrary and .n-
prieousr'-action which is not properly related to the furtherance of a legitimate govern-
mental objective. Cf. Takahashi v. Fish and Game Commission, 334 U.S. 410, 421 (1948)
Di Pasquale v. Karnuth, 158 F.2d 878 (2d Cir. 1947). The substantive duc process rights
of NALens include the requirements of the Equal Protection Clause. Cf. Bolling v. Sharpe,
347 U.S. 497, 500 (1954); Hurd v. Hodge, 334 U.S. 24, 35 (1948).
S. Naturalization statutes are enacted pursuant to Article 1, Section 8, which provided
that Congress has power "[t]o establish an uniform Rule of Naturalization." No uniform
rule of naturalization existed prior to the Constitution. One State conferred citizensil )
whenever a foreigner landed on its shores. Other states required waiting periods of
varying lengths. The lack of national uniformity imposed hardships; a person might lose
his citizenship merely by moving to another state. F. VAN DYNE, A TAisn ON TH E .AW
OF NATURALIZATION or THE UNITED STATES 6 (1907). The framers of the Constitution re-
alized the importance of relieving this confused condition. See James Madison in S Tim
RECORDS Or THE FEDERAL CONVENTION or 1787 at 548 (Revised ed. M. Farrand ed. 1966).
4. United States v. Macintosh, 283 U.S. 605, 615 (1931). See Fong Yue Ting v. United
States, 149 U.S. 698, 707-708 (1893). In re Warkentin, 93 F.2d 42, 43 (7th Cir. 1937), cert.
denied, 304 .ln563 (1938); United States v. Tapolesanyi, 40 F.2d 255, 257 (3rd Core, 1930);
in re Taran, 52 F. Supp. 535, 539 (D. Minn. 1943).
Asserting that there is no "right" to be naturalized, courts have concluded that Congress
is not obligated to grant citizenship to any alien. City of Minneapolis v. Reum, 56 F. 76,
577 (8th Cir. 1893); United States v. Zgrebec, 38 F. Supp. 127, 129 (E.D. Mich. 1941). And,
assuming that citizenship can be withheld from all aliens, courts implicitly reason that:
(1) Congress has power to impose any conditions precedent because the power to with-
hold must necessarily include the lesser power to grant only upon fulfillment of conditions,
and (2) since there is no right to citizenship, the burden of proof is on the petitioner to
establish that he has met all statutory requrements.
Evidently feeling a tension between the concept of unfettered sovereign powver over
naturalization and traditional constitutional doctrines, courts have narrowly construed
naturalization statutes. In interpreting general or vague statutory requirements, jutigcs
have refused to infer a congressional intent which is inconsistent with their viewsa of
American history and concepts of justice. Girouard v. United States, 828 U.S. 61, 64 (1946).
However, when the words of the statute are clear and unambiguous, courts have con-
sistently viewed their function as merely determining whether a particular Individual
has Taet a given statutory requirement. Schneiderman v. United States, 320 U.S. 118, 132
(1943); United States v. Macintosh, 283 U.S. 605, 627 (1931) (Hughes, C. J., dissenting):
Petition of 0-N- , 233 F. Supp. 504, 509-10 (S.D.N.Y. 1964). As a result, holdings of
naturalization cases have almost exclusively involved construction and application of statit-
tory provisions rather than a determination of their constitutionality. See Note, ConsIR4-
tional Limitations on the Power of Congress to Confer Citizenship by Naturalization, 50
IoNYA L. REV. 1093, 1095 (1965) [hereinafter cdtgd as I=wA).
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I. The Doctrine of Unfettered Congressional Power and the
Naturalization Process
The naturalization process begins when a non-resident alien achieves
the status of resident alien by entering the United States on an immigra-
tion visa5 which entitles him to live permanently within the country.0
After five years in residence, a resident alien can file a naturalization
petition in a United States District Court 7 Subsequent to the filing, but
prior to court action, a special inquiry officer of the Immigration and
Naturalization Service (INS) conducts an investigation to determine
whether the government will oppose the petition.8 The final hearing
on the petition is held in open court.9
The doctrine of unfettered congressional power over naturalization
affects this process in several ways. First, a resident alien who wants to
become a citizen, will, if he is aware of the conditions in the naturaliza-
tion statute,'0 act during the five year "probationary period" prior to
filing his petition only in ways which will not jeopardize his chances for
naturalization under the statute as written. He will be unlikely to vio-
late a condition with the thought of later challenging its constitutional
validity.
Second, a resident alien who is aware that he is disqualified by the
statute as written will probably not file a petition. He will be unlikely
to incur the expenses of litigation after his lawyer informs him that,
whatever the statutory conditions may be, Congress had power to enact
. 5. The Constitution makes no express provision for control over immigration. Never-
theless, Congressional control of immigration is firmly established. The power to exclude
aliens is "inherent in sovereignty." Nishimura Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S. 651, 659
(1892). The power to deport is regarded as a corollary of the power to exclude as well as
a power incident to sovereignty. Fong Yue Ting v. US., 149 U.S. 698, 707 (1893). See Note,
Residence Requirements After Shapiro v. Thompson, 70 COLu. L,. "Lv., 134, 148 n. 57
(1970).
6. Aliens entering on nonimmigrant visas, 8 US.C. § 1184(a)(1964), can remain only
temporarily and are not eligible for naturalization. 8 U.S.C. § 1427(a)(1)(1964).
7. 8 US.C. § 1427(a)(1)(1964). Before the petition will be processed, the alien must
establish his lawful entrance and residence in this country--in short, that he is not sub-ject to deportation. 8 U.S.C. § 1429 (Supp. V, 1970), amending 8 U.S.C. § 1429 (1904).
8. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1446, 1447(d)(1964). During the course of the investigation, the officer is
allowed to question the applicant.
9. 8 U.S.C. § 1447(a)(1964).
10. Every naturalization statute has contained conditions which must be satisfied by
the applicant for citizenship. For a discussion of naturalization legislation, see Developments
in the Law: Immigration and Nationality, 66 HARV. L. REv. 643 (1953). Two general
requirements, presently compiled in 8 U.S.C. § 1427(a)(1964), are usually included: At-
tachment and allegiance to the Constitution and the nation, and good moral character
during a specified period prior to filing the petition. Past statutes have contained specific
conditions denying naturalization to Negroes, I Stat. 103 (1790); Orientals, Act of May 6,
1882, ch. 126, § 1, 22 Stat. 58 (1882); and certain classes of women, 34 Stat. 1'8 (1907). The
present statute, passed in 1952, abolishes the old restrictions based on race, = and
national origin. 8 U.S.C. § 1422 (1964). However the present law includes many other
specific limitations which will be discussed throughout the Note.
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them. Further, of those resident aliens who do file petitions, very few
proceed to the courtroom phase after an unfavorable report by the INS
special inquiry officer. In the year ending June 30, 1969, only 152 of
over 2040 unsuccessful petitions (or 7.4%) were rejected by a judge."
In terms of disappointed petitioners, therefore, the crucial part of the
process is the investigation and recommendation of the special inquiry
officer.
This wide administrative discretion is apparently fostered by the
doctrine of unfettered congressional power. As an example of this
effect, several lawyers prominent in naturalization practice 12 cited
INS administration of the statute's "good moral character" require-
ment.1 3 They reported that special inquiry officers frequently con-
dude that applicants lack the requisite moral character if they are,
for example, unemployed, receiving welfare benefits, or suffering from
a venereal disease. Such determinations, these lawyers explained, would
likely be overturned if taken to court-not because Congress is power-
less to establish such requirements, but because many judges would
hold that such conditions are not necessarily indicative of poor moral
character and hence not included under the relevant statutory provi-
sion. However, petitioners' lawyers often decide against taking such
cases to court, because INS officials have told them that, if administra-
tive determinations that certain statuses are indicative of poor moral
character are overturned by the courts, the Bureau will ask Congress to
exercise its "unfettered" power and write explicit statutory restric-
tions.14 Rather than engage in protracted litigation which, in the long
run, would likely result in congressional action damaging the interests
11. The statistics cited throughout this Note were compiled by the American Council
for Nationalities Service in Naturalization Statistics for 1969, 47 INTEUMER R rLnAEsl:s
166-173 (No. 25, July 9, 1970).
12. Interviews were conducted with lawyers specializing in deportation and naturaliza-
tion law, and prominent in the following organizations: New York Legal Aid Society,
American Civil Liberties Union, American Council for Nationalities Service, and American
Committee for the Protection of the Foreign Born. By agreement, they will not be
identified.
These interviews were not an attempt to poll a "statistically valid" cross.sectlon of
naturalization lawyers, but rather an effort to learn the views of several lawyers prominent
in the field.
13. See note 10 supra.
14. The threat is not a hollow one, as is demonstrated by the Immigration and
Nationality Act of 1952, presently in effect. Prior to the enactment of that statute, some
courts had overruled the INS and held that adultery per se was not sufficiently indicative
of poor moral character to warrant denial of naturalization, Petition of Rudder, 169 F.2d
695, 698 (2d Cir. 1947), cited in Petition of O-N-, 233 F. Supp. 504, 506 (S.D.N.Y. 190),
and that extenuating circumstances should be considered. Congress responded with an
explicit provision in the 1952 Act denying naturalization to adulterers .er se, see 8 U.S.C.
1101(f)(2), and that provision has been enforced. See 233 F. Supp. at 50b.07, 509-10, 509.10
and cases cited at 507; cf. Zacharias v. Shaughnessy, 221 F.2d 578, 579-80 (2d Cir. 1955).
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of Tesident.aliens in general,.these lawyers advise their clients to with-
draw their petitions, and to file new ones five years after the termina-
tion of the disqualifying condition.15 This practice must at least partly
explain why, of the 571 petitions which failed on moral character
grounds in the year ending June 30, 1969, only thirteen (2.3%) were
taken to court.
In sum, the doctrine of unfettered power affects the naturalization
process not only through unchallenged statutory requirements, but
also through the power which the threat of future legislative action
enables administrative officials to wield.
II. The Case Against Unfettered Power
To understand why the doctrine of unfettered power should be
abandoned, and normal standards of constitutional adjudication ap-
plied in naturalization cases, it is necessary, first, to consider the ano-
malous character of this doctrine in the American consitutional system,
and, second, to evaluate the rationales for unfettered power over
naturalization.
A. Constitutional Text and Governmental Structure: An Anomaly
The Constitution grants powers to the national government and
rights to individuals. A cardinal principle of constitutional interpreta-
tion is that neither the powers nor the rights are absolute' 0-neither the
government nor the individual automatically prevails. Instead, courts
struggle to find the proper accommodation between competing inter-
ests.17 Under a concept of unfettered power, however, courts do not
engage in a balancing process; the government automatically prevails.
Individual interests, no matter how important, can be abridged by
legislative action, without a consideration of the substantiality of the
government interests furthered.
All the other powers enumerated in Article I, Section 8, in which
the naturalization power is located, have been interpreted in accordance
with the principle of non-absoluteness.' 8 Since there is no indication in
the constitutional text that the naturalization power is unique, it would
15. Under the statute, only the five years immediately preceding the filing of a petition
can be considered in determining moral character. 8 U.S.C. § 142'(a)(1964).
16. See Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268, 273 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
17. Even when the government interest prevails, the fact that an "accommodation"
is made indicates that the individual interest is given some weight; it imposes some limit
on the power of government to act.
18. See IoWA, supra note 4, at 1099.
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seem-simply as a matter of consistency in textual interpretation-that
it should be similarly interpreted.
More important than an inconsistency in textual interpretation is
that the doctrine of unfettered power over naturalization is inconsist-
ent with the principles of the governmental system created by the
Constitution. 9 One basic purpose of the constitutional system of limited
powers is the preservation of individual freedoms. That purpose re-
quires that there be no absolute governmental power. Otherwise, the
framers' entire design could be frustrated, for the exercise of one un-
limited power could destroy the rights which the carefully constructed
limitations on the others were intended to preserve.2 0
B. The Inadequacy of the Rationales for Unfettered Power
Three reasons might be advanced to justify the anomaly of unfettered
congressional power over naturalization. The first is that it is a neces-
sary corollary of Congress' unfettered power to deny an alien initial
entrance into the nation.21 The second reason is that the status of citi-
zenship is "vitally important," since it defines the relation between man
and state.22 And the third is that, since naturalization policies affect the
nation's foreign relations, the branches of government with responsibil-
ity for diplomacy must have absolute discretion in formulating those
policies.23
1. Corollary of the Power to Exclude
In Fong Yue Ting v. United States, the Supreme Court asserted that
the national government has absolute power to exclude all non-
19. As Professor Charles Black has argued, STRucruR AND RELATIONStHP IN CoNsrTru-
TioNAL LAW (1969), the Constitution can be read as a structural blueprint for a govern.
mental system as well as the source of specific rules. Doctrines and laws can be analyzed
in terms of their congruence with the system's structure as well as their conformity to
the specific rules. Since the existence of an unlimited congressional power is antithetical
to a structure of limited government, one should not be presumed from the mere inclu.
sion of a power in article I, section 8. See IOWA, supra note 4, at 1098.9.
20. Limitations on government power might be viewed in two ways. One theory might
construct limitations in the abstract. That is, even in the absence of injury to spe cfic
individuals, government would be prohibited from acting in certain ways. Even though
such a theory is arguably appropriate with respect to various constitutional provisions,
e.g., the Establishment Clause, it is clear that under the American system liltations
can be enforced against government only when individual interests are adversely affected.
Cf. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968). Putting aside such abstract notions of limitations
on government power in the absence of persons with constitutionally protected interests
which are affected sufficiently to confer standing to seek judicial redress, it is clear that,
in a system in which individual rights are protected by limitations on governmental
powers, no power should be deemed unfettered when its exercise impinges directly on
protected rights.
21. Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 713 (1893).
22. See IOWA, supra note 4, at 1097 n. 22.
23. Lapides v. Clark, 176 F.2d 619, 621 (D.C. Cir. 1949), cert. den. 338 U.S. 888 (1949).
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resident aliens, or to admit them "only in such cases and upon such
conditions as it may see fit to prescribe,"2 4 and further that "[t]he right
of a nation to expel or deport [resident aliens, which obviously entails
the right to deny them naturalization) ... rests upon the same grounds,
and is as absolute and unqualified, as the right to prohibit and prevent
their entrance into the country."-5 However, even if the power to
exclude is unfettered,28 it seems clear that the powers to deport and to
deny naturalization are distinguishable from it. The basic justification
for an absolute power to exclude, as the Court in Fong Yue Ting
seemed to recognize, is the international law concept of territorialityf
-a state's domestic law has no effect outside its borders, except as it
relates to its own citizens.' s Since the Constitution, like every other
American law, is subject to this geographic limitation, potential im-
migrants who, at least in the eyes of the law, remain outside American
borders,29 cannot claim rights under the American Constitution. 0 Under
the doctrine of territoriality, in short, aliens seeking initial entry may
be entitled only to those "rights" which Congress has granted them.2 1
The concept of territoriality, however, has no application to deporta-
tion and naturalization proceedings, which concern resident aliens, 2
and take place wholly within the jurisdiction of the United States. The
Constitution's geographic limitations, therefore, are not controlling.
Thus, even if the power to exclude is deemed unfettered, it does not
follow that the power over naturalization must be.
24. 149 U.S. at 705.
25. Id. at 707. [Emphasis added.]
26. But see Note, Opening the Floodgates to Dissident Aliens, 6 HARv. CtV. PRcHrs.Civ.
Lm. L. REv. 141 (1970) arguing that an alien's entry may be required to enforce a citizen's
right to hear. See also, Mandel v. Mitchell, 39 U.S.L.W. 2531 (E.D.N.Y., March 30, 1971).
27. 149 U.S. at 706. See dissent of Justice Brewer, id. at 738.
28. See, Craig, Application of the Trading With the Enemy Act to Foreign Corpora-
tions owned by Americans: Reflections on Fruhoub v. Massardy, 83 HAMW. L REv. 577,
586 (1970). United States v. Rodriquez, 182 F. Supp. 479, 488 (S.D. Calif., 1960); American
Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347, 356-57 (1909); The Apollon, 22 US. (9
Wheat.) 362, 370 (1824).
29. Often, the alien is outside American territory only by legal fiction. For example,
aliens entering by the port of New York are restricted to Ellis Island until the question
of their right to enter is ruled upon. Clearly, Ellis Island is part of American territory.
The fiction allows the alien to disembark while his entrance is considered.
50. But see note 28 supra.
31. See Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 544 (1950); Ludecke .. Watkins, 335 U.S.
160, 171-72 (1948); Nishimura Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S. 651, 659.60 (1892).
82. Kwong Hai Chew v. Colding, 344 U.S. 590 (1953); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S.
856, 369 (1886); Carmichael v. Delaney, 170 F.2d 239, 243 (9th Cir. 1948); United States
ex tel. Tom We Shang v. Murff, 176 F. Supp. 253, 256.57 (S.D.N.Y. 1959). For a dear
example of the difference between exclusion and deportation, compare Ng Fung Ho v.
White, 259 U.S. 276 (1922), with United States v. Ju Toy, 198 U.S. 253 (1905).
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2. The "Vital Importance" of Citizenship
It has been suggested that some courts, viewing unfettered power
over naturalization as implicit in the concept of national "sovereignty,"
have evinced a belief that "a sovereign nation has such a vital interest in
citizenship that the system of constitutional government underlying the
nation can be disregarded when Congress exercises the naturalization
power."' 3 An analysis of the importance of naturalization to the govern-
ment34 must focus on the government interest in preventing the change
in its relationship to the individual.
The grant of citizenship alters the power and obligations of the
government with respect to the individual in three ways: 1) the govern-
ment must afford the individual diplomatic protection when he travels
abroad; 2) the government loses the ability to deport the individual;
and 3) the individual becomes entitled to vote and hold public office.
The government interest in preventing the first two of these changes
in the individual-government relationship can be translated into the
interest in avoiding expense. First, the requirement that the government
afford naturalized citizens diplomatic protection entails administrative
costs in issuing a passport and affording access to American consuls
abroad.85 Second, the power to deport, which the government loses
upon naturalization, 6 might be exercised in two types of situations,
First, the government might deport a person who had performed acts
detrimental to the public welfare, such as criminal acts. Deportation of
such persons would serve both to deter the general class of deportable
persons from committing such acts and to ensure that those who did
would not repeat the offense within the jurisdiction. However, as-
suming that an act is detrimental to the public welfare, it would be (or
could presumably be made) a crime; substantially the same two func-
33. IOWA, supra note 4, at 1097 n. 22.
34. There is no doubt that the status of being an American citizen is of un!iue im-
portance to individuals. Schneiderman v. United States, 820 U.S. 118, 122 (1943). hat a
"benefit" is of great importance to those desiring it, however, is hardly a reason for allow-
ing the government unlimited discretion in "distributing" it. On the contrary, the greater
the individual's interest in obtaining the benefit, the more it would seem that a justifica.
tion for its denial should be required. Cf. Kramer v. Union School District, 895
U.S. 621, 626 (1969); Douglas v. California, 373 U.S. 353, 358 (1968); Harper v. Virginia
Board of Elections, 883 U.S. 668, 667 (1966); Griffin v. Illinois, 851 U.S. 12, 17 (19.56);
Charles Reich, The New Property 72 YALE L.J. 733, 781,787 (1964); Michelman, infra note 103
at 13. The unique importance of citizenship is a justification for unfettered power, there-
fore, only insofar as absolute discretion over naturalization is vitally important to the
government.
35. There is also the possibility that a naturalized citizen's actions abroad may affect
American foreign policy; but it will be argued that this consideration does not justify
unfettered power. Seepp. 780-84 infra.
36. A citizen, whether naturalized or native-born, cannot be deported. Ng Fung Ho
v. White, 259 US. 276 (1922).
776
Vol. 80: 769, 1971
Constitutional Limitations on the Naturalization Power
tions would be accomplished through the law of crimes. That is, crimi-
nal sanctions both deter potential violators and enable the state
to remove actual violators from the community, if not from the
jurisdiction. Assuming that deportation and incarceration are sub-
stantially equivalent means for accomplishing those two functions,31
the state's interest in employing the former method is only that it
avoids expense.38
The second reason why the government might deport a person is
that he has a status detrimental to the public welfare, such as a con-
tagious disease, which represents both a drain on the economic resources
of the nation and a threat to the health of others. The threat to the
health of others can in turn be translated into an economic drain, since
an alternative means of dealing with the threat would be to isolate the
person in a hospital quarantine. 39 Thus, the government interest in
being able to deport persons with detrimental statuses, as was the case
with those who commit detrimental actions, is that deportation is the
least costly means of handling the problem.
A conseqence of limiting the naturalization power, then, would be
that the government will be forced to incur some costs that it could
otherwise avoid. The application of constitutional limitations to the
naturalization power would undoubtedly result in the naturalization
of some persons whom the government would otherwise disqualify, and
the government would be forced to spend more money on those persons
than if they had not been naturalized.
Additional expense, however, is ineluctable when any power is
fettered. All other powers of the national government have been
deemed fettered even though the necessary consequence has been that
the government has had to incur greater costs to achieve its goals 0 That
37. Of course, they are not equally efficient. Deportation adds a measure of permanence
not usually available with incarceration, even though the length of incarceration is pre-
sumably fitted to the gravity of the crime. The important point to keep in mind, howevr.'m
is that limiting the naturalization power does not mean that the government is powerless to
prevent the naturalization of, for example, resident alien murderers and rapists. Assuming
that there is a legitimate government interest in preventing naturalization of criminals,
and it will be argued in a later section that there is, those persons with a propensity for
serious crime can be weeded out. Thus, since those persons who are naturalized will have
demonstrated during their five year probationary periods that they are law-abiding, there
is no reason to believe that the loss in efficiency in achieving the above two goals will have
any practical effect.
38. For example, there are costs of maintaining the person in prison that would be
alleviated if he were deported.
39. The same argument can be made for most other detrimental statutes. The poor
could be helped by welfare funds, the sick by health insurance, and the old by social
security. In each case, all that the government must provide is monetary expenditures.
But cf. pp. 808-09 infra.
40. RoBERr DAHL, A PREFAcE To DEtocRATIc TunoRy 36 (1956).
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is, an increase in expense for the government has been considered an
acceptable price for a system of limited government powers. Since
there is no reason to believe that the expense involved in limiting the
naturalization power is especially large in comparison with the expense
incurred in limiting other powers, powers which have been limited, it
would not seem that this government interest in an unfettered natural-
ization power is, in quantitative terms, especially "vital."
The only way to distinguish the expense involved in fettering the
naturalization power from that involved in fettering other powers is
that the naturalization power affects the interests of resident aliens,
rather than those of citizens. Only if resident aliens are less deserving
than citizens in terms of what they can legitimately expect from govern-
ment should the naturalization power be considered unique.
This issue is also raised by the last of the three effects of naturaliza-
tion on the government/individual relationship-the requirement that
government allow the individual to vote and to hold public office.
That requirement must be considered in light of the facts that a) even
after naturalization, the government can bar an individual from voting
and holding public office if there is a compelling reason for doing So, 41
and b) fettering the naturalization power will not mean that every
alien will gain these rights through naturalization; rather, the govern.
ment will simply need a constitutionally valid reason for disqualifica-
tion. In other words, the consequences of fettering the naturalization
power will be, not complete governmental impotence, but an inability
to deny the vote and eligibility for public office to resident aliens for
any reason which Congress alone deems suflcient. That inability is a
justification for unfettered power only if absolute governmental dis-
cretion to bar resident aliens from the political process is implicit in,
or at least consistent with, the resident alien/government relationship.
Thus, both the government interest in avoiding extra expenditures
for resident aliens and the government interest in retaining absolute
discretion to bar resident aliens from the political process can be
reduced to the proposition that resident aliens are less deserving than
citizens of governmental protection and benefits. The issue of unfet.
tered power over naturalization, in short, turns on a value judgment
concerning the place of resident aliens in American society.
The relationship between the resident alien and the national govern-
ment consists of mutual obligations. The resident alien is required to
give obedience and allegiance to the government; in return, he is
41. See pp. 800-03 infra.
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entitled to protection from the government.4 This type of reciprocity,
furthermore, has been used by the Supreme Court to define the relation-
ship of man to state known as "citizenship." 3 Citizens, like resident
aliens, are entitled to protection from the government in return for
their assumption of the obligations of obedience and allegiance. It
would seem, therefore, that a judgment concerning the protection to
which resident aliens are entitled, relative to the protection afforded
citizens, should depend on the extent of the resident alien's obligations,
relative to those of citizens.
Resident aliens are required to obey all valid laws of the federal and
state governments," and are fully taxed and fully liable to be drafted to
fight for the United States. Further, resident aliens can be convicted of
treason, indicating that they owe the government full allegiance.4 In
short, resident aliens, as permanent members of the population, have
the same obligations to the national government as do citizens40
Therefore, if persons who are similarly situated with respect to their
duties to government should be entitled to similar treatment from
government, resident aliens should be able to enjoy the same protection
from adverse government action as citizens.
This analysis of the relation between the alien resident and the state
implies that if the government interest in avoiding costs is insufficient
to justify unfettered power when citizens' interests are at stake,
it should be likewise insufficient when resident aliens' interests are
at stake. Further, if resident aliens are entitled to full protection, the
government must be prohibited from arbitrarily infringing their inter-
ests, just as it is prohibited from arbitrarily infringing the interests of
citizens. Put another way, the interests of resident aliens impose a limit
on the ability of government to act. Thus, it is not "vitally important"
that the government have absolute discretion to deny resident aliens
the vote. On the contrary, the judgment that resident aliens should be
42. Wong Kim Ark v. United States, 169 U.S. 649, 694 (1898).
43. "Citizenship is membership in a political society and implies a duty of allegiance
on the part of the member and a duty of protection on the part of the society. These are
re droa obligations, one being a compensation for the other." Luria xr. United States,
231 US. 9, 22 (1913). Sae also Minor v. Happersett, 88 US. 01 Wal) 162, 165.6 (1874).
44. Carlisle v. United States, 83 US. (16 Wall.) 147, 154-5 (1873).
45. A person cannot be guilty of treason if he does not owe allegiance. An act which
is treasonable if the actor owes allegiance is not treasonable if he does not. The rationale
for a resident alien's liability for treason is that he receives the protection of the nation's
laws and hence owes allegiance. Powers, Treason by Domiciled Aliens, 17 MTArn" LAw
Rzvmw 123, 123-4. This theory was taken to its extreme in United States %. Shinohara,
Mfilitary Commission Cases No. 134819, where an enemy alien residing in a territory of the
United States was held to owe allegiance, notwithstanding the fact that the territory was
occupied by the enemy nation of which he was a citizen. Note, Treason, A Brief History,
22BRooKLYN LAW Rr.vw 254 (1956).
46. 2 WH.rroN INTE1mATXONAL LAw Dir.sr, Sec. 198 at 485 (1887).
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fully protected would seem to require that the government's ability to
deny them the rights to vote and hold public office be limited.47
3. Diplomatic Imperatives
The argument that unfettered power over naturalization is justified
because it allows for maximum flexibility in an area affecting foreign
affairs seems untenable after the decision of the Supreme Court in
Schneider v. Rusk.48 That case concerned the validity of a statute that
provided that "a person who has become a national [citizen] by naturali-
zation shall lose his nationality [citizenship] by... having continuous
residence for three years in the territory of a foreign state of which he
was formerly a national. '4 Since native-born citizens cannot be de-
prived of their citizenship for mere residence in a foreign nation, the
statute clearly created an inequality between naturalized and native-
born citizens.
The first clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, however, guarantees
full rights of American citizenship to persons "naturalized in the
United States"; 50 and the Supreme Court has consistently held that
naturalized citizens are fully equal with native-born citizens, except for
a constitutional disability to be elected President.5'
47. The American constitutional system assumes that the surest way to protect the
populace from arbitrary government action is by having the people themselves, through
their elected representatives, determine the substance of the laws which they must obey.
Thus, if the interests of resident aliens are to be fully protected, as their assumption of
full obligations indicates, it is necessary that they be assimilated into the structure of
consent-giving. Similarly, there seems to be no government interest in preventing a person
who has demonstrated obedience and allegiance from holding public office if the people
choose him.
An other conclusion would result in the exclusion of a portion of the nation's popula.
tion rom the body politic, as did the Supreme Court's infamous decision in Dred Scott
v. Sanford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857), excluding slaves.
48. 377 U.S. 163 (1964).
49. 8 US.C. §§ 1101, 1484 (1964). Schneider, a derivative American citizen who had
married a German and settled in Germany, was refused a passport renewal by the
Secretary of State, who claimed that she had lost her citizenship by virtue of her residence
in Germany. Nearly twenty years earlier, a District of Columbia Court used a similar
statute to uphold the expatriation and exclusion of a naturalized citizen for spending
twelve years in Palestine. Lapides v. Clark, 176 F.2d 619 (D.C. Cir. 1949). The Court gave
the following reason for legislation, id. at 621:
To lessen friction with foreign governments growing out of disputes as to the
nationality of our naturalized citizens and their offspring residing for prolonged
periods in foreign lands.
50. "All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the juris-
diction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside."
U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1.
"A naturalized citizen . . . becomes a member of the society, possessing all the rights
of native citizens, and standing, in the view of the Constitution on the footing of a native,
The Constitution does not authorize Congress to enlarge or abridge those rights." Osborn
v. United States Bank, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738, 827 (1824).
51. See Baumgartner v. United States, 322 U.S. 665, 673 (1944); Luria v. United States,
231 U.S. 9, 22 (1913).
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The government attempted to justify the statutory inequality under
the foreign relations power, arguing that, since other nations frequently
attempt to treat naturalized American citizens living abroad as their
own citizens, the restriction was necessary to prevent the United States
from becoming embroiled in diplomatic crises.52 The Supreme Court,
stressing the constitutional requirement of equality between natural-
ized and native-born citizens, rejected the notion that the foreign
relations power could justify the creation of "a second class citizen-
ship," s and struck down the law.54
The Schneider holding has necessary implications for the doctrine of
unfettered power over naturalization. As an alternative to the statute
at issue in that case, Congress might as easily have attempted to achieve
the same result through an explicit exercise of the naturalization
power. 55 For example, it might have decreed that naturalization con-
ferred only limited rights to resident aliens, specifically withholding
the right to live abroad. Alternatively, Congress might have required
applicants for naturalization to take an oath that they would never
reside abroad, or that they would "voluntarily" relinquish their citizen-
ship if they did so.5u Either of these alternative statutes---explicit
exercises of the naturalization power-would have achieved the same
52. The treaty power had frequently been used to avoid this kind of international
tension. Agreements were negotiated to the effect that naturalized citizens would lose their
citizenship if they were to reside for an extended period in their native country. See e.g..
the Bancroft treaty with the North Germany Confederation, 15 Star. 615, 616, 617
(1868).
53. 377 U.S. at 168-69.
54. The Schneider holding was not shaken, although it ias limited in scope, by the
recent Supreme Court opinion in Rogers v. Bellei, 39 U.S.LW. 4354 (April 6, 1971), up-
holding statutory provisions granting citizenship at birth to a person born abroad to
parents, one of whom is an American citizen who has met specified residency requirements,
but providing that such citizenship is revoked unless the person resides in the United
States for five years between the ages of fourteen and twenty-eight. Justice Blackmun's
majority opinion turns on a strict reading of the initial sentence of the Fourteenth
Amendment, which refers to persons "born or naturalized in the United States, and subject
to the jurisdiction thereof." (emphasis added). The Court limited Schneider to persons who
are naturalized in the United States, according to the procedures outlined in Section I
above. This Note, insofar as it argues from the functional equivalence, in terns of duties
and obligations, between resident aliens and citizens, has implicitly adopted the same
limitation-without, of course, necessarily implying agreement with the Belei case.
55. The statute invalidated in Schneider was apparently not an explicit exercise of
the naturalization power. It was placed in chapter 3 of the Immigration and Nationality
Act of 1952, which was entitled "Loss of Nationality." That chapter included provis!ons
withdrawing nationality from both native-born and naturalized citizens. Thus. unlike
chapter 2, which dealt only with naturalization, chapter 3 apparently went be)ond the
ambit of the naturalization power.
56. During the first half of this century, the Supreme Court upheld an oath requiring
that applicants for naturalization pledge to relinquish rights enjoyed by native born
citizens. See United States v. Macintosh, 283 U.S. 605 (1931); United States v. Sdhwimmer,
279 U.S. 644 (1929). Petitioners were rejected unless they pledged, as an indication of their
allegiance to the nation, a willingness to bear arms. At the same time, native born
citizens were, if they met certain criteria, legally entitled to conscientious objector excmp.
tions from combatant service.
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diplomatic objectives, and created the same "second class citizenship,"
as the provision at issue in Schneider.57
It seems highly unlikely that such legislative action, unjustifiable
under the foreign relations power, could be upheld under the naturali-
zation power. Almost thirty years before Schneider, the Supreme Court
had made it clear that the national government, when acting in the
international arena pursuant to the foreign relations power, possesses all
powers which inhere in the concept of national sovereignty.58 A statute
passed pursuant to the naturalization power, therefore, could not draw
upon any additional or greater "sovereign powers" than those which
were exercised in passing the statute at issue in Schneider.59
Moreover, the government's attempted justification for the statute in
Schneider-the need to avoid diplomatic disputes-is identical with the
"diplomatic imperatives" justification for unfettered power over natu-
ralization. 0 In the Schneider situation, international friction might be
caused by other nations treating naturalized Americans living abroad as
their own citizens; in the naturalization context, it might be caused by
the United States treating the citizens of other nations as its own citi-
zens. Since maximum flexibility in avoiding international friction was
deemed insufficient to justify creation of a "second class citizenship"
In Girouard v. United States, 328 U.S. 61 (1946), the Supreme Court overruled Its
earlier decisions denying naturalization to applicants who refused to take such an oath.
The decision, however, turned on statutory construction, rather than constitutional inter-
pretation. Congress, the Court determined, had demanded only that applicants pledge
their allegiance; and, since an unwillingness to serve in a combatant capacity was tradi-
tionally not inconsistent with allegiance, the justices "could not assume that Congress
intended to make such a [requirement] ... unless it spoke in unequivocal terms." Id. at
64-65.
57. The first alternative would clearly create a second class citizenship. Similarly, Te.
garding the second alternative, naturalized citizens who had taken an oath to restrict their
activities would not be free to fully enjoy rights possessed by native-born citizens. (The
source of the right-that is, whether it is constitutional or statutory-is of no consequence.
But see, to the contrary United States v. Macintosh, 283 U.S. at 623; IoWA supra. note 4,
at 1106 n. 63. Full equality between naturalized and native born citizens cannot exist un-
less the former can enjoy all the rights which the latter enjoy, regardless of source.) If
the oath were legally binding after naturalization, that is, if the new citizens were
deemed to have waived the right to act as natives may, then the inferior status of
naturalized citizens would be clear. And, even if it were held that the oath was not
legally binding after naturalization, that is, that it could be required of applicants but
not enforced after the petition was granted, naturalized citizens would still not be on
the same footing as native born citizens. First, it must be assumed that some naturalized
citizens will feel honor-bound to abide by their solemn oaths, even in the absence of le al
compulsion. Cf. Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360, 374 (1964). And second, aliens who
fraudulently obtain citizenship can be denaturalized. 8 U.S.C. 1451 (1954). A naturalized
citizen who had taken the oath with the intent to break it could therefore lose his
citizenship; and, more importantly, the risk of appearing to have taken the oath fraudu-
lently would likely deter some naturalized citizens who had taken it honestly but sub-
sequently changed their mind.
58. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 804, 315.18 (1986).
59. Certainly there is no reason to believe that the naturalization power incorporates
any greater inherent sovereign powers than does the foreign relations power.
60. Cf. Lapides v. Clark, 176 F.2d 619, 621 (D.C. Cir. 1949).
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through the Schneider statute, the conclusion seems compelled that the
same consideration would be insufficient to justify creation of an identi-
cal "second class citizenship" through a naturalization statute, which
could draw upon no greater "sovereign powers" than the Schneider stat-
ute.
In short, the necessary implication of Schneider v. Rush is that the
naturalization power is limited, at least so far as it is exercised to
abridge the rights of naturalized citizens.61
There is no reason, however, to limit the scope of Schneider's impli-
cations for the naturalization power to the rights of naturalized citizens.
In fact, the invalidity of the hypothetical oath requirement, mentioned
61. It is clear that the constitutional rights of naturalized citizens impose the following
limit on the power of Congress to make rules for naturalization: Congress may not con-
dition naturalization on a pledge to act in a way restricting the rights of citizenship; nor
may it, in yan other manner, use the naturalization power to create a limited or restricted
class of citizens.
Under this rule, an argument might be made attacking the validity of the oath of
allegiance in the present statute. 8 U.S.C. 1448 (1954). It does not demand a pledge to
bear arms; but, as a demonstration of allegiance, the applicant must swear either to bear
arms, or, if he can prove by clear and convincing evidence that he is unable to do so
because of religious training or belief, to accept conscientious objector status, and, if
required by law, to perform noncombatant military or civilian duties.
This oath is clearly less restrictive than the one at issue in Girouard; but it does pre-
clude naturalization for aliens who object to war for nonreligious reasons or who object
only to particular wars. See eg., In re Weitzman, 284 F. Supp. 514 (D.C. Minn. 1968).
This oath does not require a pledge to refrain from exercising "legal rights." In essence,
it requires nothing more than a promise to act in accordance with a particular law, the
statute concerning conscientious objector status and noncombatant service, which applies
to all citizens. Nevertheless, it may be subject to attack.
There is a question as to whether this oath is sufficiently related to a legitimate
legislative purpose to withstand a challenge under the Due Process Clause. The purpose
of the oath of allegiance, as the Court assumed in Girouard. 328 U.S. at 64165, is to
ensure that naturalized citizens are loyal to the United States. To that end, the alien,
before he can become a citizen, is required to swear that he will demonstrate his allegiance
by performing, after naturalization, a specific act, acceptance of required national service.
Some naturalized citizens, therefore, those who took the oath honestly but changed their
beliefs after naturalization, may be coerced, by honor or the threat of denaturalization
and deportation, to accept national service (rather than a jail term).
A constitutional difficulty may arise because, at least insofar as expatriation and de-
naturalization proceedings are concerned, the Supreme Court has held that no one act is
sufficiently probative of a person's allegiance to the nation to be, by itself, controlling.
See Afroyim v. Rusk, 387 U.S. 253 (1967) (voting in a foreign election); Trop v. Dulles,
356 U.S. 86 (1958) (desertion in wartime). See also Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S.
144, 187 (1963) (Brennan, J., concurring); Note, 59 MicH. L. REv. 960, 93 (1961) (draft
evasion). Certainly a refusal to bear arms or accept other national service because of
sincere religious or moral beliefs is not necessarily inconsistent with allegiance to the
nation. Thus, although the fact that an applicant had refused to bear arms or accept
alternative service while a resident alien, or intended to so refuse after naturalization, un-
doubtedly has some probative value rearding nonallegiance (so that questions on the
subject would be relevant to a general investigation of his allegiance), it is questionable
whether a promise not to refuse in the future is, by itself, suflciently probative under
the Due Process Clause to justify the coercion of naturalized citizens. Compare Schware v.
Board of Bar Examiners, 553 U.S. 232, 246-7 (1957) and Konigsberg v. State Bar of Cali.
fornia, 353 U.S. 252 (1957) with Konigsberg v. State Bar of California, 366 U.S. 36 (1961).
(Past Communist Party affiliation is not a proper ground for refusing admistion to the
bar, but questions on that subject can be asked in a general investigation of the applicant's
fitness.)
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above, indicates that Schneider's scope includes the resident alien. Al-
though the reason the oath would be invalid is that it would abridge
the rights that will be the resident alien's after he becomes a naturalized
citizen, the constitutional prohibition against such an oath, to be
effective, must be enforcible against the government by the resident
alien-the power is not unfettered with respect to him.
Once it is established that the naturalization power is limited with
respect to the resident alien, it should be clear that he must be able to
assert, not only the rights that will become his after naturalization, but
also rights which are his as a resident alien. If resident aliens are to be
protected from adverse government action as fully as citizens, as their
assumption of equal obligations implies, a power which is fettered
with respect to citizens' rights must also be fettered with respect to
resident aliens' rights. Even if different constitutional rights are as-
sumed to be of different "importance, 6 12 it would not follow that
government power is unfettered with respect to the "lesser" rights.
Rather, the importance of the right would be considered in the accom-
modation which is made when the power is exercised to create a con-
flict between the right and governmental interests.
In sum, since the rationales for unfettered power over naturalization
are inadequate, and since there are strong countervailing considerations
in both policy and case law, the doctrine should be abandoned. 3
III. Denial of Naturalization on the Basis of a Resident Alien's
Voluntary Actions
A. The Doctrine of Unconstitutional Conditions
The doctrine of unconstitutional conditions was developed04 in order
to prevent individuals from being forced to choose between disqualifi-
62. Although it might be argued that some constitutional rights have "primacy" over
others, it cannot be assumed that the same right is less important when possessed by a
resident alien than by a citizen. First, there is no indication in the constitution that the
First Amendment, the Due Process Clause, and the Equal Protection Clause, among other
provisions, protect resident aliens to a lesser degree than citizens. Second, if resident aliens
are to be fully protected in American society, as their assumption of equal duties and
obligations suggests, their rights must be of the same scope as citizens'. Further, there Is
no indication in the cases dealing with aliens (in contexts other than exclusion, deportation,
and naturalization), that the rights of aliens are of less consequence than those of citizens.
See note 2 supra.
63. Further, if the naturalization power is limited, the deportation power must be.
Since deportation precludes naturalization, it is clear that all restrictions on congressional
power to refuse naturalization also apply to the deportation power. Grounds for deporta.
tion are not valid, in other words, unless they could also be grounds for denial of
naturalization.
64. For general discussion of the early cases expounding the doctrine see Hale, Un.
constitutional Conditions and Constitutional Rights, 35 COLUm. L. REv. 321 (1935); Merrill,
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cation for governmental benefits and the exercise of constitutional
rights. 65 Generally, the doctrine holds that even though the government
is not obligated to provide a benefit, that is, even though the benefit is
a "privilege," it may not be withheld or cancelled for the exercise of
constitutional rights.06 The concern has been with both the unfairness
of such sanctions67 and their substantial "chilling effect"'' 6 on the exer-
cise of important rights. 9
The doctrine of unconstitutional conditions does not impose a
mechanical test. Generally, however, in order to justify the withholding
of a benefit from a person because he performed an act which is
constitutionally protected in other contexts, the government must
prove: 1) that the condition imposed is closely related to the nature of
the benefit granted,70 or 2) that the condition protects important social
interests from persons whose capacity for inflicting damage would be
substantially increased by possession of the benefit.7 ' In addition, the
doctrine of less drastic means applies.72 That is, even if one of the above
criteria is met, a court must weigh the degree to which the exercise of
Unconstitutional Conditions, 77 UNn,. oF PA. L. REv. 879 (1929); Oppenheim, Unconstitu-
tional Conditions and State Powers, 26 MICH. L. Rnv. 176 (1927). For more recent treat-
ment see O'Neill, Unconstitutional Conditions: Welfare Benefits with Strings Attached,
54 CALiF. L Ruv. 443 (1966); French, Unconstitutional Conditions: An Analysis, 50 Gso.
L.J. 234 (1961); Note, Unconstitutional Conditions, 73 HAv. L RL. 1595 (1960); Willcox,
Invasions of the First Amendment Through Conditional Public Spending. 41 Coruu
L. REv. 12 (1955); Note, Judicial Acquiescence in the Forfeiture of Constitutional Rights
Through Expansion of the Conditioned Privilege Doctrine, 28 INDIANA L.J. 520 (1953).
65. The exercise of constitutional rights can be inhibited in two ways. First, negative
sanctions such as imprisonment, fines, or a tax might be imposed on persons who cxer-
cised certain rights. Second, there are "positive sanctions"--government distribution of
benefits conditioned on a recipient's "voluntary" non-exercise of certain rights. Thus,
instead of being imprisoned or fined, an individual who acts in a certain manner may be
disqualified for public employment, McAuliffe v. New Bedford, 155 Mass. 216, 29 N.E.
517 (1892), professional licensing, Spivack v. Klein, 385 U.S. 511 (1967). social security
benefits, Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603 (1960)-or naturalization.
66. Note, Unconstitutional Conditions, 73 HARv. L REv. 1595, 1599 (1960). See Stein-
berg v. United States, 163 F. Supp. 590, 592 (Ct. Cl. 1958). See also Speiser v. Randall, 357
U.S. 513, 518-20 (1958). But cf. Wyman v. James, 91 S.Ct. 381, 386 (1971).
67. Slochower v. Board of Education, 350 US. 551, 555 (1956); Wienan v. Updegraff,
344 U.S. 183, 192 (1952). See Patton v. North Carolina, 381 F.2d 636 (4th Cir. 19 7), cert.
denied, 890 US. 905 (1968).
68. Cf. Note, Civil Disabilities and the First Amendment, 78 YALE UJ. 842 (1969). Sec
Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360, 372 (1954).
69. The growth of judicial concern can be traced by comparing McAuliffe v. New Bed-
ford, 155 Mass. 216, 217; 29 N.E. 517, 517-518 (1892); Bailey v. Richardson, 182 F.2d 46,
57, 59 (D.C. Cir. 1950); Adler v. Board of Education, 342 U.S. 485, 492 (1952), with Garrity
v. New Jersey, 885 U.S. 493, 499-500 (1967); Keyeshian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589,
599-600 (1967).
70. The focus has been on whether the condition bars the individual in a "patently
arbitrary or discriminatory" manner. Wieman v. Updergralf, 344 U.S. 183, 192 (1952);
Speiser v. Randall, 57 US. 513, 518-19 (1958). See lawsen v. Housing Authority, 270 Wis.
269, 287; 70 N.W.2d 605, 615; cert. denied, 350 U.S. 882 (1955). But see Fleming v. Nestor,
863 US. 603 (1960).
71. These rules are suggested in Note, Unconstitutional Conditions, 73 HArnv. L REv.
1595, 1600 (1960).
72. Cf. Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488 (1960).
785
The Yale Law Journal
important constitutional rights is discouraged against the difference in
efficiency between the condition imposed and another condition less
restrictive of constitutional freedoms.7 3
The doctrine of unconstitutional conditions, then, does not assume
that any rights are "absolutely" protected. Rather, it holds that if
certain actions have been deemed protected in contexts unrelated to the
granting of a benefit, they cannot be made grounds for denying the
benefit unless the above test is satisfied.
The applicability of the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions to
requirements in the naturalization statute cannot be avoided by the
contention that, although Congress cannot directly penalize resident
aliens for constitutionally protected actions in a non-naturalization
context, it can evaluate the manner in which they exercise their rights
in determining their "worthiness" for naturalization. 4 Although Con-
gress may legitimately attempt to restrict naturalization to those aliens
who are worthy of citizenship,7r actions which are constitutionally pro-
tected should be per se irrelevant to a determination of unworth.10 In
short, if standards of constitutional adjudication are applied to the
naturalization process, the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions is
applicable.
B. Application of the Doctrine to the Present Statute and to Admin-
istrative Practices77
Much of the history of deportation and naturalization laws in the
United States can be written in terms of congressional efforts to rid the
nation of political radicals.78 To avoid banishment or disqualification
73. Cafeteria Workers Union v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886 (1961); Homer v. Richmond,
292 F.2d 719 (D.C. Cir. 1961).
74. Such a contention was made by the Supreme Court in United States ex rel. Turner
v. Williams, 194 U.S. 279, 292 (1904); cf. Trap v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 124 (1958) (Frank-
furter, J., dissenting).
75. See pp. 798-802 infra.
76. By definition, the fact that an act Is protected means that it has enough social
worth to justify a limitation on the power of government. In other words, even though a
person's life style or philosophy is obnoxious to the majority, his actions are "worth "
at least to the extent that they are constitutionally protected-for to that extent t&e
social value of his actions outweighs the discomfort or harm caused to the majority, See
Maisenberg v. United States, 3356 U.S. 670 (1958); Nowak v. United States, 856 U.S,
660 (1958); Schneiderman v. United States, 320 U.S. 118 (1943). Actions with social value
such that government cannot "reach them" in other contexts cannot be rational grounds
for denial of a benefit on the grounds of unworthiness.
77. In the following section, the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions is applied to
first amendment rights, since those rights are abridged by the present statute. However,
the argument would apply as well to other rights, for example, the right to a jury
trial, or "private" actions protected from governmental interference by Grfswold v. Con.
necticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). In connection with the right to privacy, see 8 U.S.C. 1182
(1954) dealing with sexual perversion. See also Boutilier v. I.N.S., 887 U.S. 118 (1967). Cf.
In re Labody, 39 U.S.L.W. 2558 (S.D.N.Y., April 13, 1971).
78. It was observed in 1948, KANsoN, U.S. IaMGRATIOf 206-26 (1948), that every major
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for citizenship, the resident alien has had to be a political conformist,
or at least a silent critic of the system.
The present statute continues in this tradition. It provides that "no
person shall hereafter be naturalized... who advocates or teaches ...
opposition to all organized government; or... who... advocates the
economic, international, and governmental doctrines of world com-
munism or the establishment in the United States of a totalitarian
dictatorship."'s0 It is clear from decisions in other contexts, however,
that mere advocacy of abstract doctrines-whether of communism,
anarchism, or totalitarianism-is speech protected by the First Amend-
ment. Advocacy can be outlawed only when it incites illegal action;81
but the act makes no such distinction.
In addition, the statute precludes naturalization for any alien who is
a member of, or affiliated with, the Communist Party, other com-
munist organizations, or other organizations devoted to various unde-
sirable purposes.82 Membership by itself is sufficient;s3 there is no
change in the law had broadened the political grounds for deportation or denial of
naturalization. In the Alien and Sedition Act of 1798, 1 Stat. 570, June 24, 1798, the
President was empowered to deport any alien he found dangerous to the peace and
safety of the nation. In 1903, Congress provided for deportation and denial of naturaliza-
tion for mere belief, devoid of action or advocacy. Act of March 3, 1903, ch. 1012, 32
Stat. 1214. See Turner v. Williams, 194 U.S. 279 (1904). In 1918, the law was amended to
broaden the range of prohibited political views. Act of Oct. 15, 1918, ch. 186 Sec. 1, 40
Stat. 1012. And, two years later, governmental suppression of aliens expression culminated
in the infamous Palmer "red raids." See L Posr, TnE DrPo RTATION DrLurum oF 1920
(1923). The purpose behind these acts was stated by the Bureau of Naturalization: "As
long as the advocates of these malignant and un.American doctrines remain aliens, they
may be deported and their gospels may be overthrown at their inception, but once they
succeed in obtaining their citizenship, this method of pur ing our country becomes more
difficult, if not impossible." Bureau of Naturalization Radio Release No. II, Oct. 16, 1922.
as noted in W. PEsroN, ALIENs AND Dhssr.wrans 64 (1963). The following excerpts from
the Congressional Record are illustrative of the attitude of some legislators toward aliens:
"Now, I would execute these anarchists if I could, and then I would deport them, so that
the soil of our country might not be polluted by their presence even after the breath had
gone out of their bodies." 51 CoNG. REc. 2892 (1914) (remarks of Rep. Sla)'den). "Free
press is ours, not theirs; free speech is ours, not theirs, and they hae gone just as far as
we can let them go toward running over our most precious rights." 59 Coxo. RFae 9247
(1920) (remarks of Rep. Johnson.
79. W. PPXSrON, ALmNS AN DsismNris, supra note 78, at 82. Cf. Commager, Who is
Loyal to America? 195 Harper 193, 195 (1947.
80. 8 U.S.C. 1424 (1954). This has permitted courts to reject petitioners who have done
nothing more than teach or believe in the principles of anarchy or Communism. See
Petition of Millan, 266 F. Supp. 545, 551-52 (C.D. Calif. 1967). The statute also forbids a
finding of good moral character for any alien advocating pol)gamy, 8 U.S.C. 1182 (11)(1964).
81. The essential distinction is that those to whom the advocacy is addressed must be
urged to do something, now or in the future, rather than merely to believe in something.
Yates v. U.S., 354 U.S. 298, 312 (1957). See Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 885 U.S. 589, 59.9-
600 (1967). While the above cases were criminal, the Court has refused to allow the with.
drawal of benefits for advocacy that could not be criminally punishable. Speiser v. Randall,
357 U.S. 513, 519 (1958); cf. Thompson v. Gleason, 317 F.2d 901, 906 (D.C. Cir. 1962).
82. 8 U.S.C. 1424 (1964).
83. See Berenyi v. Immigration Director, 85 U.S. 630 (1967); Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S.
,522 (1954). Even membership in a predecesor or successor organization, regardless of its
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requirement that it be knowing, active, and with the specific intent to
further illegal objectives.84 Yet the Supreme Court has insisted on such
a requirement before membership can be discouraged by criminal
statutes.8, Prohibition or discouragement of any association with or-
ganizations having both legal and illegal purposes,"" without regard to
the nature and degree of affiliation, is impermissible under the First
Amendment.8 7
name, is sufficient. Citizenship can thus be denied for membership in, or affiliation with,
a group that did not evidence alignment with a prohibited group.
84. 8 U.S.C. 1424(d) (1964) provides that membership in a disfavored organization Is
not disqualifying if the alien can prove that the membership has been terminnated and
that it was coerced by law, necessary to obtain the essentials of living, involuntary (i.e.
mistaken), or terminated before the age of sixteen.
85. U.S. v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258, 262 (1967); Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 878 U.S.
500, 510 (1964); Scales v. U.S., 367 U.S. 203, 229 (1961).
86. Schneiderman v. U.S., 320 U.S. 118, 136 (1943): "JB]eliefs are personal and not a
matter of association . . . men in adhering to a political party or other organization
notoriously do not subscribe unqualifiedly to all its platforms or asserted principles."
87. Scales v. U.S., 867 U.S. 203, 229 (1961). See Chicago Housing Authority v. Blackman,
4 Ill. 2d 319, 122 N.E.2d 522 (1954) (members of an organization designated by the Attorney
General as subversive may not be denied public housing unless their knowledge and sup.
port of the aims of the organization are considered).
In 1945, the Supreme Court hinted that a First Amendment limit on deportation
statutes might exist. Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135 (1945). In that case, the government
had attempted to deport a resident alien who, while not a member of the Communist
Party, was "affiliated." Id. at 156. Although the decision turned on statutory construction,
the Court implied that its construction was necessary to avoid First Amendment dif-
ficulties. Id. at 148. This aspect of the decision, however, has not been further developed
by the Court.
It should be noted, additionally, that the statutory provision denying naturalization to
members of the Communist Party is also vulnerable to attack as a bill of attainder pro.
hibited by Article I, Section 10 of the U.S. Constitution. On its face, there is no indication
that the prohibition protects only citizens; and the contrary is suggested in United States v.
Lovett, 328 U.S. 303, 315-16 (1946). The clause prohibits any legislative act whidtch "tries"
or "punishes" a named or easily ascertainable person or group of Persons without a
judicial trial. Id. at 815-17; see Ex parte Garland, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 833, 377; United States
v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437, 442 (1965).
Attempts to apply the Bill of Attainder Clause to deportation and naturalization laws
have been frustrated by two limitations traditionally placed on its application. See Iow&
supra note 4, at 1107:
1) The imposition of punishment is considered to be an essential element of a bill of
attainder. Otherwise, the statute is regarded as a permissible regulatory action. Cf. Hawker
v. New York, 170 U.S. 189, 196 (1898). Yet, deportation or denial of citizenship, properly
viewed, are "punishments" for purposes of the Bill of Attainder Clause. Although
deportation or denying naturalization to Communist Party members has been con-
sidered an attempt to "prevent" disloyal acts, the Supreme Court has recognized that
punishment, as it relates to the bill of attainder provision, can be preventive as well as
retributive. United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437, 441-42. Deportation has been recognized
as punishment in other contexts. Fong Haw Tan v. Phelan, 33 U.S. 6, 10 (1948). Further,
inherent in the denial of citizenship is denial of the franchise, a traditional means of
punishment under the English "bills of pains and penalties," from which the American
concept of Bill of Attainder is partly derived. United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. at 441-42.
2) Another element of a bill of attainder is reference to an inescapable class. Communist
Party v. Subversive Activities Control Bureau, 367 U.S. 1, 88 (1961). As a group, the Com-
munist Party is clearly an inescapable class, for regardless of changes in its aims and pur-
poses, its members would be excluded. Individual members can of course leave the Party,
but the bill of attainder prohibition cannot be averted by asserting that a person can
give up lawful membership in a named association. See Aptheker v. Secretary of State,
378 U.S. 500, 507 (1964).
Further, in 'Brown, the Supreme Court adopted an, expansive interpretation of the
788
Constitutional Limitations on the Naturalization Power
In addition to the literal application of specific statutory provisions,
the wide discretion wielded by special inquiry officers has reportedly
been used in ways inconsistent with protected expression. Several of the
lawyers interviewed reported that special inquiry officers often ask peti-
tioners a wide range of "opinion questions" in an effort to determine if
they are "subversive." Since the officers' determinations are virtually
never reviewed, they are free to base findings of disqualification under
the statute's moral character or political activity provisions on "unsatis-
factory" answers. As an example of the use of administrative discretion
against political "radicals," one lawyer related the case of an alien
(unnamed because proceedings are still pending) who was found by an
INS official to be of poor moral character for the sole reason that he had
signed a petition opposing the war in Indochina and had spoken at an
antiwar rally on a college campus.8
These statutory provisions and administrative practices are uncon-
stitutional unless the test outlined above is satisfied. That, however, is
highly unlikely. First, there is little apparent relationship between the
benefit conferred and the condition imposed-the non-exercise of con-
stitutional rights certainly is a strange criterion of eligibility for formal
"membership" in the constitutional system. Second, since by definition
constitutionally protected actions are consistent with the national well-
being, there is no important social interest served by discouraging such
actions.8 9
In addition, the free speech rights of citizens require that the First
Amendment rights of resident aliens not be "chilled" by conditions in
the naturalization statute; for, unless the rights of expression and asso-
ciation of resident aliens and citizens are coextensive, discrimination
against classes of citizens will result. If, for example, both Pro-X and
clause, viewing it as a corollary of the principle of separation of powers. 381 U.S. at 442.
Congress can adopt general rules requiring that any person (or group) who commits
specified acts or possesses specified characteristics be treated in a certain way. It cannot
determine which particular persons or groups have committed the specific acts or pos-
sess the specified characteristics. 581 U.S. at 461. Yet Congress has done precisely that in
denying citizenship to Communist Party members. It has not enacted a general rule pro-
hibiting the naturalization of persons who are disloyal or dangerous, leaving the applica-
tion of the rule in specific cases to the judiciary. Rather, Congress has usurped thejudicial function by making the determination that specific persons-alien Communist
Party members--come within the prohibited class. Id.
In sum, Congress may not, in violation of the bill of attainder prohibition, conclusively
presume any individual or specified group of individuals to be ineligible for naturalization.
88. He had never been arrested; nor had he engaged in acts of violence. The exact
context of these acts was not made clear, but the lawyer clearly stated his opinion that the
acts were constitutionally protected.
89. And even if there were such an interest, it would be furthered only slightly by a
law affecting only a small part of the population. Citizens would be free to perform
the very same acts.
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Anti-X speech are protected for citizens, but only Pro-X speech is pro-
tected for resident aliens, then the citizen-advocates of "X" would be
given an unnecessary and entirely artificial competitive advantage over
citizen-advocates of Anti-X. The Pro-X Party could benefit from resi-
dent alien membership and advocacy, while the Anti-X Party could
not. This discrimination would be even more serious if the difference
in protection between citizens and resident aliens were carried over
into the naturalization process. If Pro-X aliens could be naturalized but
Anti-X aliens could not, the government would be impermissibly in-
creasing the voting power of the Pro-X Party relative to the Anti.X
Party. Thus, in order to prevent a skewing of the natural competition
of ideas and votes among citizens, .it is necessary that aliens within the
jurisdiction be free to engage in the full range of expression that is
protected for citizens.
Furthermore, the capacity of aliens to inflict real social harm through
unprotected actions would not be significantly increased by the pos-
session of citizenship. Unprotected actions which injure the public
interest are (or can be made) criminal; and criminal statutes, of course,
are applicable to naturalized citizens as well as resident aliens.90
Denying naturalization on the basis of constitutionally protected
actions, then, substantially furthers no important social interest; and
the social interest in discouraging unprotected actions harmful to the
state can be adequately protected by denying naturalization to aliens
who have engaged in such actions, and by criminally prosecuting all
members of the population-citizen and alien alike-who do so.
The rights abridged by current statutory provisions and adminis-
trative practices--expression and association-are of paramount im-
portance both for the individual and the social system. 9' Further, the
degree to which the exercise of those rights is discouraged must be
substantial, for it would be difficult to overestimate the value of the
privilege conferred.92 Not only is the coercion powerful, its effect is
broad in scope. Since under the doctrine of unfettered power there is
no ex post facto limitation on Congress or the INS, the resident alien
will be forced to steer wide of expression or association which might be
90. In fact, denying citizenship to aliens with unpopular political views might well
increase the possibility of political violence. If access to the ballot box, the traditional
means of instigating social and economic change in the United States, is denied to the
resident alien, he may resort to other means of exerting pressure on the political system.
91. EMERSON, supra note 2, at 10.
92. "By many it is regarded as the highest hope of civilized men." Schneiderman v.
United States, 320 U.S. at 122 (1943). Citizenship is a prerequisite for voting, running for
many offices, and being licensed to practice many professions.
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deemed suspicious in the future when he files his petition.m In
sum, confronted with a choice between full expression or "playing it
safe" for five years and qualifying for 'citizenship, many aliens un-
doubtedly choose the latter.
It seems clear that the test imposed by the doctrine of unconstitu-
tional conditions is not satisfied with respect to numerous statutory
provisions and administrative practices in the present naturalization
process. The conditions imposed by these provisions and practices are
irrelevant to the nature of the benefit conferred by naturalization.
Further, the individual rights at stake are important, and are abridged
significantly. Thus, the statutory provisions at issue must either be
invalidated or construed to meet constitutional requirements; and the
reported administrative practices can be challenged and should be
terminated.
IV. Limitations from the Equal Protection Clause
The argument in the preceding section is only applicable to re-
quirements for naturalization which are based on voluntary actions. A
person cannot be induced or coerced to give up traits which are nor-
mally unchangeable-involuntary statuses such as race, sex, national
origin, age, poverty,94 or disease.05
Under the present statute, no resident alien can be naturalized who:
93. An analogous self-censorship has been disfavored in lo)alty oath and pornography
cases. Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 US. at 372 (1964); Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 153(1959).
94. Poverty, properly viewed, is not a voluntary condition stemming from an individ-
ual's lack of initiative, but rather an involuntary status. See MiHAct. Hlamcro.v. Tim
OTHER AmEiCA; POVERTY IN THE UNITED STATEs 18-19 (1964).
95. The present statute specifies that naturalization cannot be denied for reasons of
race or sex, 66 Stat. 239 (1952), 8 U.S.C. § 1422 (1956); but such restrictions were not rare
in the past. In 1790, the first naturalization statute, 1 Stat. 103, disqualified all individuals
except free whites. Chinese were specifically excluded from immigration and naturalization
by the Chinese Exclusion Acts of 1882, 1888 and 1892. 22 Stat. 58, 25 Stat. 504, 27 StaL 25.
While races indigenous to the Western Hemisphere were made qualified in 1940, 54 Stat.
1140, restrictions remained for. Japanese, Ozawa v. United States, 260 U.S. 178 (192);
Chinese, Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698 (1893); Hindus, Samras v. United
States, 125 F.2d 879 (9th Cir. 1942), cert. denied, 317 U.S. 634 (1942); Afgans, In re Feroz
Din, 27 F.2d 568 (N.D. Calif. 1928); Burmese, In re Po, 28 N.Y. Supp. 283 (1894); Hai-
ians, In re Kanaka Nian, 21 P. 993 (Utah 1889).
The congressional explanation for such restrictions was set forth in the Chinese Ex-
clusion Cases, 130 U.S. at 595 (1889).
Even as the last vestiges of overt racial restrictions were repealed in 1952, Representative
Wood of Idaho, commenting on the proposed Immigration and Naturalization Act, mid:
"It seems to me that the question of racial origins, though I am not a follower of Hitler-
there is something to it. We cannot tie a stone around its neck and drop it into the
middle of the Atlantic just because it worked to the contrary in Germany. The fact still
remains that the people of Westem Europe have made good American citizens." Co.o.
REc. 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 4314 (1952).
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is under eighteen years of age; 90 is or was at any time after entry a drug
addict;97 is an habitual drunkard; 8 is mentally insane, defective, or
retarded; 99 does not understand English;10° or has, during the previous
five years, spent more than 180 days in a penal institution (regardless
of when the offense was committed).10 1 In addition, several of the law-
yers interviewed reported that special inquiry officers weigh involun-
tary statuses when making discretionary judgments. Aliens who have
certain diseases-venereal diseases, for example-or who receive wel-
fare payments are, according to these lawyers, often deemed lacking
in good moral character.10 2
The validity of governmental classifications of individuals on the
basis of their involuntary statuses has been traditionally analyzed
under the Equal Protection Clause, which is applicable to the national
government through the Due Process Clause.103
A. Legislative Purposes
The preliminary steps in an equal protection analysis of laws or
administrative practices purportedly justified under an enumerated
congressional power concern legislative purpose. First, a determination
must be made as to the purpose(s) a particular provision was intended
to further. And second, it must be determined whether that purpose(s)
is "legitimate."
Those determinations, seldom easy, 0 4 are especially difficult with
respect to the naturalization power, since judges and legislators, accept.
ing the doctrine of unfettered power, have not found it necessary to
96. 8 U.S.C. § 1445 (1964).
97. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1429, 1251(11) (1964).
98. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(f)(1) (1964).
99. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1429, 1182 (1964).
100. 8 U.S.C. § 1423 (1964).
101. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(f)(7)(1964).
102. One of the lawyers interviewed reported that his "congressional sources" had
told him of "grumblings" that some legislators are considering a statutory requirement that
an applicant prove that he has not been on welfare for a given period of time before he
can be naturalized.
103. The Fifth Amendment, affecting Congress, has no Equal Protection Clause. The
Due Process Clause of that amendment, however, has been held to incorporate the re-
quirements of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Boling v.
Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 500 (1954); Hurd v. Hodge, 334 U.S. 24, 35 (1948). See also Michel-
man, On Protecting the Poor Through the Fourteenth Amendment, 83 HARV. L. REV.
7, 17 n.25 (1969); Harvith, Federal Equal Protection and Welfare Assistance, 51 AL ANY
L. REv. 210 (1967); Henderson v. United States, 231 F. Supp. 177 (N.D. Calif. 1964). Thus
the due process rights of aliens include equal protection rights.
104. Little has been written concerning the method of determining which purposes are
legitimate. The literature that does exist includes: Developments in the Law-Equal
Protection, 82 HARV. L. REv. 1065 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Equal Protection]; H. M.
HARr & A. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKIINO AND API'LICATION OP
LAw 1410-16 (1958) [hereinafter cited as HART & SACKS]; Ely, Legislative and Administra-
tive Motivation in Constitutional Law, 79 YALE LJ. 1205 (1970).
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confront the question directly. 0 5 However, each of the involuntary
status classifications mentioned above seems most likely justified, if at
all, under one or more of the following three "legitimate puposes":100
(1) To limit naturalization to those resident aliens who are loyal to
the United States and who possess good moral character.'0 7
(2) To limit naturalization to those resident aliens who are capable
of functioning as citizens; that is, those who are competent to partici-
pate in the social and political processes. 0
(3) To conserve the nation's economic, natural, and social re-
sources.
09
B. Applicable Equal Protection Doctrine
Under traditional equal protection doctrine, government classifica-
tions are invalid only if they are not "rationally related" to a valid
government purpose." 0 As will be demonstrated, some provisions of
the naturalization statute and some reported INS practices fail to meet
105. As for an analysis of "legitimate" purposes, it seems dear that a law intended
solely to discriminate against a certain class of persons should be considered invalid
by reason of an "illegitimate" purpose. That is, some classifications are unac-
ceptable, not because they are not rationally related to the purpose of the statute, but
because that very purpose is illegitimate. Equal Protection, supra note 104, at 1031.
See Ely, supra note 104, at 1224. The most precise criterion of legitimacy that has been
suggested is that the purpose be related to improving the general welfar. Equal Protec-
tion, supra note 104, at 1081. Although it has been demonstrated that such a broad
standard has, in certain cases, been rejected (at least implicitly) by the Supreme Court
(see discussion of Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U. 533 (1954), in Ely, supra note 10-4, at 1227),
it will be adopted for purposes of the present discussion, thus giving wide scope to the
naturalization ower. But see p. 797 inf ra.
In attempting to ascertain the "actual" purpose of a particular statutory provision or
administrative practice, there are again no hard and fast rules. Generally, the technique
seems to be to infer the "probable" purpose(s) of the legislature (Equal Protection, supra
note 104, at 1078) by considering the language of the statute and its legislative history,
prior legislation, accompanying legislation, and "general knowledge" concerning the
problems of the subject area to which the statute pertains. Hamr & &Scus, upra note 1041,
at 1341 suggests this technique. But see discussion of Smith v. Cahoon, 283 U.S. 553 (1931),
to the effect that courts sometimes adopt a different technique, in Ely, supra note 104, at
1225-6.
106. These purposes were derived through a combination of the "public welfare"
test of legitimacy and the "most likely inference" method of determining probable pur-
pose. Sources consulted on the latter question include immigration and nationality
statutes, congressional reports, and judidal opinions.
107. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101(f, 1182(a)(13), 1251, 1427 (1964). See also In re Nosen, 49
F.2d 817, 818 (D. Wash. 1931); Luria v. United States, 231 U.S. 9, 22-3 (1913); In re Taran,
52 F. Supp. 535, 538-40 (D. Minn. 1943); United States v. Gerstein, 28.1 IlL 174, 119 N.E.
922 (1918). Cf. In re Capozzi, 160 Misc. 200, 202-03, 289 N.YS. 869, 872 (1936).
108. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1182, 1423 (1964); H.R. Rep. No. 165, 82d Cong., 2d Ss. (1952)
reprinted in 1952 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADmr. NEvs 1653, 1736. See also speech of Rep. Wood,
supra note 95.
109. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1182(a)(7), (14), (15), 1251(a)(3) (1964). See also E., parte Fragoso,
11 F.2d 988 (S.D. Cal. 1926); United States ex rel. Markin v. Curran, 9 F.2d 900 (2d Cir.
1925); Ex parte Rokiyi Tombara, 292 F. 764 (W.D. Wash. 1923); Ex parte Mitchell, 256
F. 229 (N.D.N.Y. 1919).
110. Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 78 (1911). See generally Equal
Protection, supra note 104, at 1076-87.
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even this lenient test. Others, however, do meet the rationality test.
These latter practices and provisions are, therefore, valid-unless it is
appropriate to employ the more stringent "compelling state interest"
test11' which the Supreme Court has deemed appropriate: (1) if a
classification is "suspect," that is, if it discriminates against certain
disadvantaged minority groups; or (2) if a classification infringes upon a
person's "fundamental interests."
Since resident aliens are totally barred from the political process,
alienage is arguably a suspect classification.112 It does not necessarily
follow, however, that a strict standard of review is required across the
board in deportation and naturalization cases.113 The reason is that in
such cases aliens as a group are not the objects of discrimination. Rather,
naturalization and deportation laws necessarily discriminate among
aliens on the basis of other, presumably non-suspect, criteria.1 4 This
situation, discrimination within rather than against an arguably suspect
group, is unique, since in other contexts the very identification of a
group to discriminate within would constitute discrimination against
that group." 5 As a matter of judicial policy, it might seem that, in this
unique situation, the fact which makes alienage an arguably suspect
classification-the complete absence of resident aliens from the political
process-should also require review more strict than the rationality
111. The compelling state interest test is, in essence, an interest balanein test. It en.
tails a determination of whether the government interests furthered by certain legislation
or the individual interests detrimentally affected are more weighty. Since in the situations
in which the test is employed the individual interests are always "fundamental," see
pp. 795-98 infra, the government interest, to prevail, must be "compelling."
112. See Equal Protection, supra note 104, at 1124.
118. Of course, if a naturalization statute employed classifications which were suspect
in themselves, strict review would automatically be triggered as to those classifications,
Certainly race, religion, and national origin are suspect classifications for naturaliza-
tion purposes. Unless necessary to a compelling state interest, then, a statute which denied
naturalization on such a basis would be invalid.
It is, of course, highly unlikely that a compelling state interest could be found, since
race, religion, and national origin are dearly irrelevant to the three legitimate con-
gressional purposes set forth above (and most likely to any others which might be
postulated). Cf. Ex parte Mitsuye Endo, 823 U.S. 283, 302 (1944). To contend that such
characteristics were related to an applicant's worthiness, or to his mental and physical
capabilities to function as a citizen, or that they made him a greater burden on society's
resources than other persons, would be to assume that a particular race, religion, or
nationality was intrinsically inferior. Since such "invidious" assumptions have con-
sistently been rejected by the courts, any attempt to renew pre-1952 restrictions based on
such characteristics would be unconstitutional.
114. Since deportation and naturalization statutes discriminate within rather than
against an (arguably) suspect group, the cases requiring stringent review of suspect
classifications, which concern discrimination against suspect groups, are not on point.
115. For example, a statute which denied a jury trial to "any Black person who Is ,on
welfare" would constitute discrimination against both Blacks and poor people. However,
deportation and naturalization laws are limited by definition to resident aliens. Thus, a
statute denying naturalization to "any resident alien on welfare" discriminates against
poor people, but not resident aliens.
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test when government classifications, although non-suspect in them-
selves, affect only resident aliens.1 6
More importantly, careful scrutiny of classifications for deportation
116. The argument would proceed as follows: One of the major justifications for the
rationality test is that "interest balancing"-a decision as to the wisdom of a classificatory
scheme-is best left to the political process. The process of determining the merits of a
classification, which entails moral and political value choices as well as decisions concerning
the merits of various schools of economic and social science thought, is believed to be
better suited to legislatures than to courts. Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 4S0
(1970). Unless a classification substantially furthers no valid governmental purpome, that is,
unless it is irrational, traditional equal protection doctrine requires that judges abstain
from substituting their judgments for those of legislators, thereby preserving the integrity
of the political processes. Dennis et al. v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951) (Frankfurter,
J., concurring); Equal Protection, supra note 104, at 1077.
Implicit in this justification for the rationality test is the assumption that all groups
concerned are represented in the legislative process. Unless a group has access to the
legislature, the presumption of fairness attached to legislative balancing of its interests
against the interests of other groups which are represented is not warranted. Cf. Kramer
v. Union Free School District, 595 U.S. 621, 627 (1969); Harper v. Virginia Board of
Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 667 (1966); United States v. Carolene Prod. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153
n4. (1938); South Carolina State Highway Dept. v. Barwell Bros., 303 US. 177, 184 n.2(1938). This concern has, of course, been one of the reasons why certain underrepre.
sented groups have been identified as suspect classifications, entitled to strict review hen
they are discriminated against, and is why resident aliens, who, lacking the franchise, ob-
viously are totally barred from the legislatures, arguably constitute such a suspect
category.
It is submitted that this same concern requires a test more stringent than rationality
in cases of classifications for deportation and naturalization purposes, which uniquely
concern discrimination within an arguably suspect group. Without attempting empiricl
proof, two assumptions seem reasonable. First, even if an entire group is not being dis-
criminated against, members of many groups will likely be concerned with ensuring that
distinctions among group members are made fairly. If the group as a whole is repre.
sented in the political process, that concern is likely to be expressed through political
action. If the group is not represented, however, as aliens are not, it is difficult for
members to pressure legislators to ensure the fairness of intra-group distinctions. And
second, it is unlikely that citizens with characteristics which would cause them to be
discriminated against were they aliens will be quick to assert their political influence on
behalf of resident aliens with such characteristics. That is, even if classification "alpha"
is not normally suspect because citizen-alphas are fully represented in the political process,
it is not dear that citizen-alphas will feel sufficiently identified with alien-alphas, or suf-
fidently threatened by discrimination against alien-alphas, to bring their influence to
bear on the aliens' behalf. Certainly, whatever action they might take is likely to be less
strong than if they themselves were the objects of discrimination.
For both of the above reasons, in short, classifications concerning persons not repre-
sented in the political process, even if persons who are represented share the relevant
characteristics, are not entitled to the normal presumption of fairness. In the process of
legislative interest balancing, there is little guarantee that those persons' interests 'will
have been fairly weighed. Thus, a court, faced with the unique problem of determining
the proper standard of review for classifications discriminating within an arguably suspect
group, might well, as a matter of policy, apply a test more stringent than mere rationality.
This entire argument, of course, is made subject to the following caveat: In the usual
situation in which the courts have found classifications to be suspect, the group favored
by legislation has been represented fully in the political process and the isfavored
group has not. The fear has been that the favored group would use its political influence
to discriminate against the powerless unfavored group. In the context of the present
argument, by contrast, neither the favored nor the unfavored group is represented.
Rather, the problem is that a group which is represented (citizens) is discriminating
within a group which is not (resident aliens). The fear is that the represented group
will use its influence to serve only its interests, ignoring the interests of the uarepresented
group.
The caveat is that the above fear rests on the value judgment, made earlier, that the
interests of resident aliens are of substantial weight, and should limit the ability of
citizens to serve their own interests.
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and naturalization purposes should be required because they affect the
fundamental interests of resident aliens: naturalization is a prerequisite
for the franchise; and deportation revokes the right to reside in the
United States. Both the vote and residence must be considered funda-
mental interests within the context of equal protection doctrine.
As for the vote, the Supreme Court held in Harper v. Virginia Board
of Elections that a citizen's interest in voting is fundamental, and that
"classifications which might invade or restrain [it] ... must be carefully
confined 117 through judicial scrutiny more stringent than the rational-
ity test. Harper therefore requires the conclusion that a resident alien's
interest in voting is likewise fundamental, unless there is a difference
between the citizen's interest in exercising his right to vote and the
resident alien's interest in gaining the right to vote.
It seems clear that, in terms of importance to the individual
concerned, 118 there is no difference. As noted previously, all residents,
citizens and aliens alike, are equally affected by government policy
decisions and equally obligated to obey all laws. All residents, therefore,
citizens and aliens alike, would seem to have an equal personal stake in
being able to influence, through the vote, the policies and laws which
affect them. If the citizen's personal stake is deemed fundamental, then,
it would seem, so must the alien's." 0
The resident alien's interest in the deportation process, too, should
be considered fundamental. Deportation, which has been recognized
by courts as the equivalent of banishment or exile,120 entails drastic
personal consequences. At stake for the resident alien is his ability to
remain in the nation of which he is a permanent resident, with his
117. 383 U.S. at 670.
118. The proper focus for determining whether an interest is fundamental is its im-
portance to the individual. See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969); Griffin v.
Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956) (Black, J.); Equal Protection, supra note 104, at 112.
119. Nor should it matter that, in terms of the vote, the citizen's interest is in exer-
cising a "right," while the alien's is in gaining a "privilege." Whatever utility the right/
privilege distinction may have in other contexts, it is clear that it is irrelevant to the
magnitude of the affected person's interest. The personal interest is to be able to Influ-
ence the laws; and the personal gains which are likely to result from that ability, as well
as the personal losses which are likely to result from its absence, are not changed by
labelling the ability a privilege rather than a right. See Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. at 19.
Of course, the resident alien's fundamental interest in gaining, the vote is to some extent
entwined with his interest in avoiding deportation which will be argued below to be
fundamental. That is, the argument tat the resident alien has a fundamental interest
in participating in the formation of the laws which he has to obey to some extent aq.
sumes that he has a fundamental interest in remaining in the jurisdiction, subject to
the laws which are made.
120. Fong Haw Tan v. Phelan, 333 U.S. 6, 10 (1948); Carmichael v. Delaney, 170
F.2d 239, 245, (9th Cir. 1948). In Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1957), the Supreme Court
held that expatriation of citizens, which entails deportation, is a cruel and unusual pun.
ishment.
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home, family, friends, and business,' 2' as well as his interest in avoiding
stigmatization as an outcast. These personal interests are virtually
identical to the interests of a defendant in the criminal process, who
similarly attempts to avoid stigmatization and separation from per-
sonal and business associations due to imprisonment.1 -2
The interest of a defendant in the criminal process has, of course,
been deemed "fundamental" by the Supreme Court, at least implic-
idy;12n and the stringent equal protection test has been afforded such
persons. Since the interest of a resident alien in the deportation process
is virtually identical, 24 it would seem that government action imposing
the consequences of deportation must also be subject to the stringent
equal protection test.
This argument is, of course, subject to the caveat that, since the
Supreme Court in identifying fundamental interests has apparently
proceeded on an ad hoc basis, 25 without defining limiting principles,
arguments analogizing personal interests which the Court has not yet
considered to personal interests which it has deemed fundamental are,
as a predictive matter, uncertain. Nevertheless, unless each case in
which a fundamental interest has been identified is considered per se
unique, or unless the Court in identifying fundamental interests is
considered to be acting irrationally, arguments comparing newly con-
sidered interests to fundamental interests can be attempted. The chance
of success would seem greatest when the newly considered interests are
virtually identical with interests which have been identified as funda-
mental. That, it is submitted, is the case both in naturalization cases,
which like Harper concern the ability to vote, and in deportation cases,
which, like the cases affording strict review to criminal defendants,
concern affirmative government action stigmatizing an individual and
separating him from personal and business associations. This Note,
therefore, will proceed on the assumption that the more stringent equal
121. It must be remembered that many resident aliens have spent much of their
lives as permanent members of the American population, often entering the nation as a
child. Thus, all their personal ties may be in the United States; and, if deported they
would be strangers in their native land.
122. Indeed, the consequences of deportation are likely to be even more serious than
the consequences of imprisonment. After a prisoner has served his jail term, he is free to
return to the community, but, as a practical matter, it is virtually impossible for a resi-
dent alien who has been deported to obtain a second immigrant visa.
123. See Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956); Equal Protection. supra note 104, at
1127.
124. There is some question as to whether the scope of Griffin includes appeals from
sentences imposing a fine, rather than a prison term. See, e.g., State v. Borst. 278 Minn.
388, 154 N.W. 2d 888 (1967); Y. KAinsAR, W. LFAvE, J. IsR.Au, L. HALL, MoDmn,'i Crum-
INAL PROCEDURE 122 (1969). Whether or not Griffin can be limited in that manner, it is
clear that the case itself was concerned with the penalty of imprisonment.
125. Equal Protection, supra note 104, at 1130.
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protection test is required in deportation and naturalization cases. If a
statutory provision or administrative practice is unconstitutional under
the rationality test, that test will be employed. If the rationality test is
met, however, provisions and practices will be considered in light of the
compelling state interest test.
C. Moral Character
With respect to the first of the three legislative purposes mentioned
above, that of choosing citizens with good moral character, it would
seem that the rationality test requires classifications to be based only on
voluntary acts or omissions. Only behavior which the resident alien can
consciously control would seem to be "rationally related" to a judgment
concerning his character.120
It might be argued, however, that some seemingly involuntary
statuses are so closely associated with voluntary actions that they are,
in effect, voluntary statuses, and hence probative of character. The
statutory provision precluding naturalization of "habitual drunkards"
raises this issue.' 27 In Powell v. Texas, 28 the Supreme Court upheld, by
a vote of 4-1-4, the validity of a Texas statute outlawing public drunk-
enness. The opinion of the four Justices who voted together to uphold
the law can be read as holding that it is permissible to assume that
drunkenness is acquired through the voluntary act of drinking alcoholic
126. First, if character is viewed as a measure of ability to choose between courses of
action with different moral connotations, behavior which a person cannot consciously con-
trol is not probative. That is, since involuntary behavior is by definition unaffected by a
person's value structure, it is irrelevant to a determination of that structure.
Second, an analysis of the cases interpreting good moral character requirements (In
naturalization and other contexts) reveals that judges have considered only conduct, as
opposed to status. See Repouille v. United States, 165 F.2d 152, 153 (2d Cir. 1947); In re
Bespatow, 100 F. Supp. 44, 45 (W.D. Pa. 1951); In re Markicwicz, 90 F. Supp. 191, 194,
195 (W.D. Pa. 1950); United States v. Cloutier, 87 F. Supp. 848, 852 (E.D. Mich, 1949);
Petition of De Leo, 75 F. Supp. 896, 900 (W.D. Pa. 1948); in re Mogus, 7-3 F. Supp. 150,
152, 153 (W.D. Pa. 1947); In re Paoli, 49 F. Supp. 128, 130, 131 (NJ). Calif. 194); In re
Spenser, 22 F. Cas. 921 (No. 13,234) (C.C.D. Ore. 1878).
Finally, it would seem that classifications relevant to moral character must be limited
to voluntary actions in order to guard against discriminatory purposes. If Congress is
allowed to bar naturalization for resident aliens with statuses whi are neither volun-
tary, nor incapacitating (second purpose), nor a drain on the nation's social or economic
resources (third purpose), then the legislators would be free to find a class of persons of
bad character simply because they believed them to be inferior or unworthy. Allowing
Congress the freedom to act on the basis of such 11eliefs, however, would be nothing less
than allowing them to renew historic discriminations on the basis of classifications such
as race, sex, or nationality. That is, if Congress can act against a class merely because It
believes its members to be of bad character, without indicating a reasonable basis for
the belief, there is no principle by which a court can determine whether they are dis-
criminating for discrimination's sake. Indeed, it could be argued that congressional action
based on a mere belief in a class' bad character or inferiority can be nothing else than
discrimination for discrimination's sake.
127. The congressional belief that alcoholism is indicative of character is obvious, as
the prohibition is located in 8 U.S.C. 1101(f) (194) which defines "good moral character."
128. 392 U.S. 514 (1968).
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beverages, and is generally known to be a risk inherent in that act.'"
If their opinion is considered the law of the case, then the statutory
provision concerning drunkenness is valid under the rationality test;
for the status of drunkenness, so viewed, becomes, in essence, a "volun-
tary status." Accepting their premise, it seems clear that the voluntary
status of drunkenness would be probative of bad character, as defined
by prevailing social standards; and, since it can in the opinion of the
four Justices be made a crime, the provision would not be invalid
under the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions.130
Justice White, in the "swing opinion," assumed that although it
might be impermissible to assume that drunkenness is voluntarily
acquired, the state of being drunk in public is voluntary.13 If his
opinion is considered the law of the case, 32 then the statutory provision
denying citizenship to all habitual drunkards, not just those whose
drunkenness is manifest in public, is unconstitutional. That is, the
statutory provision is, under Justice White's assumptions, insufficiently
related to any voluntary act to be probative of unworth.
The application of the rationality test to the provision denying
naturalization to drunkards, is, then, unclear, because of the ambiguity
of the Powell decision. There is no such uncertainty, however, with
respect to the provision denying naturalization to resident aliens who
are, or who were at any time after entry, drug addicts. The Supreme
Court has held that drug addiction can be acquired in an entirely
innocent manner.134 Therefore, although addiction can of course be
acquired through a voluntary criminal act, it is not necessarily related
to such an act, and hence not determinative of bad character.13 5 The
statutory provision, which fails to discriminate between involuntary
129. Id. at 522-23.
130. Of course, the fact that an act is criminal is usually indicative of society's belief
that it demonstrates the actor's unworth. It is not clear, however, in light of the manifold
functions of the criminal law, that this is always the case. Especially with respect to
crimes of "absolute liability," the fact that an individual has committed a crime may not,
under all circumstances, be sufficiently probative of unworth to be conclusive.
131. The defendant, knowing himself to be an alcoholic could have taken precautions
against being found drunk in a public place.
1M2. Counting his vote, five Justices believed that alcoholism per se cannot be pre-
sumed voluntary.
133. This discussion has assumed that the criminal law standard of voluntariness is,
at least in this situation, applicable in the naturalization context. That is most likely a
reasonable assumption, since the question of voluntariness in Powell seems to be "factual,"
turning on empirical evidence.
134. See Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 667 (1952): Linder v. United States,
268 U.S. 5, 18 (1925).
135. Of course, a regulation denying citizenship and/or deporting those who use drugs
illegally would be acceptable under the rationality test.
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and criminal addicts, is an overinclusive classification with respect to
moral character and invalid under the Equal Protection Clause.1"0
Although the statutory provisions denying naturalization to drunk-
ards and addicts are of doubtful validity under the rationality test,
many classifications related to moral character are clearly valid if only
that test is employed. That is, under the rationality test, any voluntary
act or omission which is morally disfavored under prevailing com-
munity standards, including virtually every act which is or could be
made criminal,137 could validly be made grounds for denial of natural-
ization. If the more stringent equal protection test is employed, how-
ever, the government's interest in denying naturalization to persons
who had committed certain morally disfavored acts would have to be
weighed against the "fundamental" interest of the resident alien in
obtaining citizenship. A court would have to determine which acts are
indicative of moral character sufficiently poor so that the government
interest in denying naturalization is "compelling."
Without attempting to decide specific cases, it should be noted that,
under this test, an act might be indicative of moral character sufficiently
poor to deny naturalization even though the same act would be insuffi-
cient grounds for denying the franchise to citizens. The reason is that,
although the individual interests at stake in both naturalization and
citizen-voting cases are fundamental, the government has more at stake
in naturalization than in citizen-voting cases.
Although the Supreme Court has not recently ruled on the issue, the
government's interest in denying the vote to some citizens with very
bad character, for example, convicted felons, seems sufficiently "com-
pelling" to prevail over the individual's interest in voting.1 18 The
136. The statutory provision disqualifying aliens who have spent more than six months
in a penal institution (during the five years for which moral character is evaluated) Is
also subject to attack as not rationally related to moral character. The status of being
incarcerated is, of course, closely related to voluntary criminal acts and therefore often
probative of moral character. But the present provision may distinguish unconstitution-
ally among resident aliens who are, based on their voluntary acts, identical in worth.
First, in light of the fact that delays in detection, prosecution and appeal vary from jurts.
diction to jurisdiction and from case to case, it is possible that two aliens committing iden-
tical crimes on the same date might complete their prison terms at different times, even as-
suming that their sentences were identical. That assumption, of course, is often false,
especially in light of the possibility that one alien might demand a jury trial and the
other "cop a plea" for a reduced sentence. Thus, the involuntary status of incarceration
during the five year probationary period is often not a rational means of distinguishing
among applicants on the basis of bad character.
137. Under the unconstitutional conditions argument, it must be remembered, the act
must be unprotected.
138. The government's interest in denying the vote to citizens with very bad character,
which in terms of the first purpose defined above includes disloyalty and malevolence
towards the nation, is to protect the political process from the destructive Influences of(1) persons who do not have the best interests of the nation in view, and who therefore
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government, of course, has an identical interest in preventing resident
aliens with equally bad character from voting. Consequently, the gov-
ernment can clearly deny the vote to a resident alien who fails to meet
the character standards which can be required of voting citizens. It
does not follow from that government interest alone, however, that the
government should be able to deny such a resident alien naturalization.
The interest could be adequately served by allowing the person to be
naturalized, and then denying him the vote along with other citizens
with very bad character.
There is an additional government interest, however, which requires
that the government be allowed to deny naturalization to resident aliens
with bad character. In addition to denying him the vote, the govern-
ment has an interest in retaining the ability to deport him.130 It was
earlier asserted' 40 that the government does not gain much by retaining
the ability to deport a resident alien who, during his five year pro-
bationary period, has evinced good moral character. With respect to
resident aliens of demonstrably poor character, on the other hand, there
would seem to be a substantial government interest in protecting
society from their presence. Even if the alien had not demonstrated
character sufficiently poor for immediate deportation, 141 his demon-
strable character defects, potentially injurious to society, should
arguably be sufficient to enable the government to "keep an eye on
him"--in effect, to extend his "probationary period" beyond five years.
Since the government loses the ability to deport a resident alien when
he is naturalized, the moral character standards which resident aliens
must meet to be naturalized can be stricter than those which citizens
must meet in order to exercise their right to vote-that is, some acts
indicative of poor moral character can be grounds for denying natural-
ization even though they could not be grounds for denying the vote to
citizens. In both naturalization and citizen-voting cases, the funda-
mental individual interests in voting are of equal weight; and the
government interest in denying the vote to persons of bad character is
the same in both cases. However, the government interest in retaining
the ability to deport adds an additional weight to its side of the balance
might use their votes to deliberately harm the nation, or (2) persons who, through crim-
inal actions, have demonstrated a lack of respect for laws, and who are therefore unfit
to participate in their making.
189. Since citizens cannot be deported, Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259 U.S. 276, 280 (1922),
naturalization terminates the government's ability to deport.
140. See note 37 supra.
141. This statement, of course, assumes that the interest test is applicable, since under
the rationality test Congress could deport an alien for any bad act, without consideration
of degree.
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in naturalization cases. Therefore, along a scale of bad moral character,
the government interest will become sufficiently compelling to override
the individual interest in naturalization cases before it will in citizen-
voting cases.
In sum, if the compelling state interest test is employed, naturaliza.
tion can be denied only when a resident alien's moral character is
sufficiently poor so that the government interests in denying the vote
and retaining the ability to deport outweigh his fundamental interest
in voting. The standard could be more restrictive than in citizen-voting
cases, but would be less restrictive than under the rationality test, which
would allow disqualification for any act indicative of poor character.
D. Incapacity
Some of the statuses discussed above, such as habitual drunkenness
and drug addiction, may have such detrimental effects on an individ-
ual's physical or mental well-being that he is rendered incapable of
normal social functions. If that were the case, the individual could
validly be barred from naturalization, under the rationality test, in
furtherance of the second legislative purpose postulated above, that of
limiting naturalization to resident aliens who are capable of func-
tioning as citizens. Also in furtherance of that purpose, it would
seem that restrictions on the basis of age, insanity, retardation, or other
severely incapacitating statuses are "rationally related" to the purpose
of having capable citizens.' 42 Further, since an individual with
such statuses lacks even minimal capabilities needed to function in the
social and political processes, he could be validly denied the franchise
even if he were a citizen. 143 The interest test is therefore most likely
satisfied, since a compelling state interest is needed to deny a citizen
the vote.144
142. An understanding of the English language might also be required, since, In the
absence of a statutory prohibition, states may be able to establish such a requirement
for citizen-voters. Cf. Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966).
The courts must exercise caution, however, in holding conditions valid under this
legislative objective. Especially with regard to physical illness, there is a potential for
abuse; and there is need for a careful factual determination that the status is Incapacitat-
ing43. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C.A. § 1973bb-1 (Supp. 1971) (denying the vote to citizens under
eighteen years old); N.Y. Election Law § 152(6) (McKinney 1964) (denying the vote to those
judged incompetent or committed to an institution for the care and treatment of the
mentally ill or mentally defective).
144. It is possible, however, that the interest test would not be satisfied. The govern-
ment interest in protecting the vote from persons lacking minimal capabilities could be
furthered by allowing such persons to be naturalized, but denying the vote to them and
to all other citizens with similar statuses. However, the issue is of little consequence, be.
cause most statuses which render a person incapable of voting also preclude an under-
standing of the naturalization process. That is, a severely incapacitated person could
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It might be further suggested, however, that Congress can legiti-
mately establish restrictions based on a level of capability above the
minimum, that is, above the degree of incapacitation for which citizens
can be denied the vote. Thus, in an effort to admit to citizenship only
the "cream of the crop" of resident aliens, Congress might limit
naturalization to those with above average intelligence, knowledge, and
reading and speaking ability. Similarly, it might attempt to bar natu-
ralization to the impoverished, or to drunkards and addicts, on the
empirical assumption that they will have below average inclination or
ability for civic participation.
Such classifications would probably meet the rationality test, since
it is arguably of benefit to the nation to have an informed and
intelligent electorate. If an interest test is employed, however, regula-
tions precluding naturalization for aliens with less than a high level of
capabilities (but more than ninimum capabilities) would almost
certainly be invaliL1 45
In sum, under both the rationality and interest tests, resident aliens
incapable of normal social functions could be disqualified. Under the
rationality test, restrictions requiring a high level of ability would
probably be valid; but under the interest test they would be invalid.
E. Social Burden
With respect to the third legislative purpose postulated above,
alleviating social burdens, resident aliens who are sick or impover-
usually be denied naturalization simply bemuse he is unable to make the decisions in-
volved.
145. Under the interest test, standards for denying naturalization on the basis of
incapacity would be constitutional only if they could be used as standards for denying the
franchise to citizens. Unlike the situation with respect to moral character requirements,
see pp. 800-02 supra, there is in the case of incapacity no additional government interest in
the naturalization, as opposed to the citizen-voting, context. Putting aside until the next
section the question of statuses which are so incapacitating that they render a person a
burden on the nation's resources, the government would seem to have no interest at all
in retaining the ability to deport a self-supporting person merely because he is less in-
telligent or in other respects less able than others. Unlike a person vith bad daracter,
such a person creates no evil effects which society must guard against. That is, unlike
the case of moral character, in which the government has an interest in retaining the
ability to deport a person in order to protect society, an interest which is distinct from
its interest in denying the person the vote, in the case of maximum capacity require.
meats there is no government interest in retaining the ability to deport. The only
government interest in capacity cases, therefore, is the interest in denying the vote. Since
that interest is identical in both naturalization and citizen-voting cases, and since the
individual interest in both cases is fundamental, the interest test requires that no resi-
dent alien can be denied naturalization on the basis of incapacity unless a citizen could
validly be denied the vote on the same grounds.
Put in that context, it is clear that any attempt to limit naturalization to resident
aliens with above average capabilities would be invalid. Although minimum capabilities
may be required before a citizen can vote, it hardly need be stated that a requirement
of above average intelligence or ability would be struck down.
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ished146 are clearly burdens on the nation's economic and natural re-
sources.147 However, the denial of citizenship to resident aliens who are
diseased or impoverished, by itself, alleviates a burden on the nation's
resources only if it is permissible for the state to discriminate against
resident aliens when allocating resources to those persons in the popula-
tion who are poor or sick. That is, if resident aliens are entitled to
share in the nation's resources so long as they remain residents, it is
residence, rather than citizenship, which renders the diseased or im-
poverished resident alien a social burden.
There is little doubt that a state, within limits imposed by the
Interstate Commerce Clause, can protect its resources from consumption
by classes of persons who do not make a financial or material contribu-
tion to the state.114 The class of aliens who are state residents, however,
makes the same financial and material contribution to the state as do
state citizens.' 49 Both classes of residents-aliens and citizens-con:
tribute directly to the state through taxes; and both classes aid in
economic development through employment and investment. Because
they undertake identical financial commitments to the state, resident
aliens and state citizens must be considered "similarly situated" with
respect to public programs, facilities, and property.5 Although denying
public aid to resident aliens would no doubt conserve state resources, 16
it would do so through the "irrational" means of discriminating among
state residents, all of whom are equally entitled to use state resources.162
This conclusion seems compelled by two Supreme Court decisions.
In Takahashi v. Fish and Game Commission, the Court invalidated a
California statute which prohibited the issuance of fishing licenses to
146. If restricting naturalization on the basis of poverty or non-incapacitating diseasecan be justified, it must be under the third purpose. Since such statuses arc in the cyes
of the law involuntary, they are not rationally determinative of an applicant's worth.
147. It is costly in terms of scarce medical facilities and manpower to care for the
diseased, even if they can afford to pay for medical services. Persons with contagious dis-ea s spread harm to others, multiplying the economic burden. Persons .ho are impov-
erished and on welfare live off the fruits of the 
labor of others. And nethr the diseased
nor the impoverished are likely to contribute substantially to the nation's economy
through gainful employment.
148. Cities Service Gas Co. v. Peerless Oil and Gas Co., 840 U.S. 179 (1950); HudsonWater Co. v. McCarter, 209 U.S. 549 (1908).
149. A state eitizen is merely a national itizen who is a state resident. US. Colvr,
amend. X.IV, § 1. See Hammerstein v. Lyne, 200 Fed. 165, 169 (1912).
150. See Note, 17 N.Y.U. L, Q. R~v. 242, 245-46 (1940).151. It would also save money to deny welfare to all Blacks, women, etc. Yet, those
discriminations would dearly not be allowable merely to further a conservative fiscal
policy.152. Of course, if the earlier suggestion that alienage is a suspect classification Is ac-
ceted, see pp. 794-95 supra, an interest test could alternatively be used to find such dis.
c umination illegal
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resident aliens who were ineligible for naturalization.1 0 In Shapiro v.
Thompson, the Justices invalidated a state statute which discriminated
against new (in favor of old) residents in allocating welfare payments.""
Both cases proceed upon the assumption that present residence, rather
than citizenship or any other status, entitles a person to a full share of
the state's resources.:1
Since it is not permissible for a state to discriminate against resident
aliens when allocating public resources, no economic burden would be
relieved by denying citizenship to sick or poor aliens who thereafter
remain residents. In other words, denying naturalization to aliens who
are sick or poor is "rationally related" to the third legislative purpose
only if such a status is grounds for deportation as well as denial of
naturalization. The issue, then, is whether Congress could validly re-
quire the deportation of such resident aliens.
As a corollary to its power to establish requirements for immigration,
it would seem that Congress can require deportation of resident aliens
who entered the country in violation of valid entry requirements.1 0
Specifically, if the statute regulating initial entry contains restrictions
153. 334 US. 410, 421 (1948). The Court initially considered the case under the ra-
tionale of Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33 (1915), which held that the federal government,
by lawfully admitting an alien into the nation, grants him the right to live and work
in any state. That right, Traux held, cannot be limited by state legislation-unless the
state can show a "special public interest." In Takahashi, California contended that its
property interest in fish within three miles of its coast was "special." The Supreme
Court rejected that contention. It stated, first, that since the fish were migratory, they
were not the property of California. Next, the Court held that even if the fish were a
state resource, and the state therefore entitled to conserve them, they must be conserved
for the benefit of all lawful residents of the state, citizens and aliens alike. 334 U.S. at
419-22.
154. 394 US. 618 (1969). The Court commented: "We have difficulty seeing how, long-
term residents who qualify for welfare are making a greater present contribution to the
State in taxes than indigent residents who have recently arrived." Id. at 632. See also,
Note, Residence Requirements After Shapiro v. Thompson, 70 COLuM. L. Rxv. 134 (1970),
"[The] justification for denying welfare benefits to aliens is even less substantial than
those offered and rejected in Shapiro to justify the denial of these benefits to indigent
citizens who have recently entered the state. The alien may have lived in the community
for years, paid taxes, and served in the American armed forces; yet, if he is blinded or
becomes aged, there is no assistance forthcoming from the state." Id. at 141. The Co-
lumbia Note suggests that, although the states cannot discriminate against resident aliens
in allocating public funds in the absence of federal authorization, Congress might
validly authorize such treatment. Id. at 143-44. Such a suggestion would seem to ignore
the fact that the federal government is also bound by the Equal Protection Clause, se
note 103 supra.
155. In Purdy & Fitzpatrick v. State, 71 Cal. 2d 566, 581, 456 P.2d 645, 656, 79 Cal.
Rptr. 77, 88 (1969), the California Supreme Court recognized the lesson of these cases
and explidtly denied the state the power to favor its own citizens in the disbursement
of public funds. The United States Supreme Court, this term, has agreed to rule on the
question of state welfare laws disqualifying resident aliens, since three.judge district
courts in Pennsylvania and Arizona have invalidated such statutes. Richardson v. Graham,
313 F. Supp. 34 (D. Ariz. 1970), 39 U.S.,.W. 3255 (US. Dec. 14, 1970), Sailer v. Leger,
39 U.S.L.W. 3255 (U.S. Dec. 14, 1970).
156. As noted above, see p. 775 supra, Congress arguably has unfettered power over
an alien's initial entry.
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against aliens who are diseased or impoverished,1' 7 a resident alien can
be deported if, at the time of entry, he had a disqualifying status. The
grounds for deportation would be, in essence, illegal entry.'0 8
It would be a far different matter, however, to hold that Congress
can require deportation of an alien who had entered legally, but who
acquired a burdensome status after entry.159 Under the rationality test,
deportation of such persons would probably be valid, since the purpose
of conserving resources is legitimate and the discrimination among
resident aliens on the basis of burdensome statuses rationally furthers
the purpose. However, under the compelling state interest test, the
result is different.
As for the status of poverty, an analogy can be made to the Supreme
Court's decision in Griffin v. Illinois,60 which invalidated a state sys.
tem of appellate review of criminal convictions in which the availability
of an appeal was conditioned on payment for a stenographic transcript
of the trial. Although the Court recognized that an appeal might be a
privilege rather than a right-that is, that the state might constitution-
ally deny an appeal to all convicted defendants-it held that, once the
state made provision for an appeal in some cases, it could not deny it to
defendants unable to afford a transcript. 01
Griffin, in which the Court apparently applied the interest test, was
cited earlier to support the argument that the individual interests at stake
in the deportation process are "fundamental." The reason was the virtual
identity between the consequences of criminal conviction and deporta-
157. See 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(1), (2), (4), (5), (6), (15) (1964).
158. That, of course, is not to suggest that such a policy would be wise-only that
it would be constitutional.
159. If the government attempted to deport such persons merely because they were
on the welfare rolls or in the hospitals, then the law would clearly be invalid. As noted
above, resident aliens, so long as they have resident status, have a constitutional right
to an equal share in public programs and resources. Even though there is no right to
obtain a certain status, such as residence, it should be clear that the status cannot be
revoked merely because a person exercised a constitutional right inherent in the status.
Cf. Gardner v. Broderick, 392 U.S. 273 (1968), in which the Supreme Court held that
although a policeman had no "right" to public employment, he cannot be fired merely
because he invoked the privilege against self-incrimination before a grand jury. Similarly,
it would seem that a resident alien could not lose his "privilege" (residence) merely be.
cause he invoked the privilege against self.incrimination-or othenvise accepted the bell.
efits of American residency.
160. 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
161. Id. at 18. See also Williams v. Illinois, 599 U.S. 235 (1970) (forbidding Illinois
from keeping an indigent in jail beyond the maximum period fixed by statute for the
crime in order to "work off" a fine); Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963) (holding
that an indigent has a right to counsel on appeal); The Supreme Court, 1969 Term,
84 HARV. L. REv. 30, 46 (1970); Note, Adequate Appellate Revicw for indigents.
A Judicial Blend of Adequate Transcript and Effective Counsel, 52 IowA L. Rrv. 902(1967); Comment, Equal Protection and the Use of Fines as Penalties for Criminal Of.fences, 1966 Ur~. OF ILL. LAw FoRum 460.
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tion-both involve stigmatization and separation from personal asso-
ciations. Since Griffin held that the consequences of conviction cannot
be imposed on the basis of classifications concerning wealth, and since
the consequences of deportation are virtually identical to those of
conviction, it would seem that deportation likewise cannot be imposed
on the basis of poverty. That is, whether or not government has an
affirmative duty to alleviate the hardships inherent in the status of
poverty, Griffin makes it clear that the government cannot take affir-
mative action-whether imprisonment or deportation-imposing,
through criteria based on wealth, the additional hardship of separation
from personal associations.62
In sum, the rationality test is not met by the denial of naturalization
to resident aliens who are impoverished. The denial of citizenship
would alleviate no economic burden because: resident aliens are en-
tided to a fair share of the nation's resources, and resident aliens cannot
be deported on the basis of poverty.103
The same line of argument would appear generally to preclude
deportation of resident aliens on the basis of burdensome statuses other
than poverty. As for deportation of diseased resident aliens,'"1 it is
clear that if the government purpose were viewed as conservation of
162. Further, the case for the unconstitutionality of a law deporting resident aliens
on the basis of poverty is even more compelling than the case against the law at issue in
Griffin, for, in the case of such a law, Congress could achieve its purposes through means
less harmful to constitutionally protected interests. Without deporting impoverished resi-
dent aliens, Congress could substantially protect the nation against 'imported parasites"
and foster economic development by regulating initial entry of non-resident alens. See
note 157 supra. That is, it could issue immigrant visas only to persons who were healthy
and, if not wealthy, employable. There is little necessity, in other words, to impose extra'
ordinary hardships on those aliens who enter legally but who, perhaps through no fault
of their own, "fall on hard times" once within this country.
It could be alternatively argued that, with respect to granting citizenship (which entails
granting the right to vote), economic purposes are not legitimate. See Harper v. Virginia
Board of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966) (invalidating a poll tax qualification for voting), in
which the Court stated: "Wealth, like race, creed or color is not germane to one's ability to
participate intelligently in the electoral process. lines drawn on the basis of wealth and
property, like those of race, are traditionally disfavored." Id. at 668. See also Kramer v.
Union School District, 395 U.S. 621 (1969); Ely's discussion of Re)molds v. Sims, supra note
104, at 1227; Note, Ownership of Land as a Prerequisite to the Right to Vote: Equal or Un-
equal Protection, 117 U. OF PA. L. Rlv. 594 (1969). Thus, although it has been assumed
that economic purposes are legitimate, it may be that in some contexts they are invalid.
163. Of course, although this conclusion is put in terms of the rationality test, the
second point on which it is based was deduced through the interest test.
If the argument that the naturalization process concerns fundamental individual
interests is accepted, the interest test could be employed at the outset, and an assertion
made that the state interest in denying naturalization to poor people is not "compelling."
The more involved argument was made above because it more closely parallels the case
law.
164. As was the case with poverty, the denial of naturalization, by itself, would not
be a rational means to conserve public funds or protect the health of citizens--ince it is
residence rather than citizenship which causes the burden. See p. 804 supra. The proper
focus, therefore, is whether such persons could be deported.
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economic resources (the disease being viewed as an economic burden),
the analysis would be identical to the one above. Disease would, in
effect, be translated into a wealth classification.
A law requiring deportation of resident aliens with contagious
diseases, however, might be viewed as a public health measure, serving
the additional government interest of protecting the health of other
members of the population. Notions of fairness aside,1°5 there is cer-
tainly a valid government interest in preventing physical suffering
among citizens; and deportation of resident aliens with contagious
diseases would obviously further that interest.100 As noted in a previous
section, 1 7 however, that governmental interest can be translated into
an economic interest-the interest in avoiding the expense entailed in
isolating the alien in a hospital until the disease has run its course.
That, of course, is the method the government employs when citizens
contract dangerous contagious diseases. The government interest in
deporting rather than isolating can only be that the former method is
cheaper.
The question with respect to contagious diseases becomes, then,
whether the government interest in saving expenditures outweighs the
fundamental individual interest in avoiding the consequences of de-
portation. Although the classification is not based on wealth, Griffin
would seem to be relevant again, for both the individual and the govern-
ment interests at stake in the contagious disease situation are the same
as those at stake in Griffin. The individual interest is in avoiding per-
manent separation from personal associations; the government interest
is in reducing expenditures.0 8 In Griffin, when the interest test was
employed, the former was found to outweigh the latter. It would seem,
then, that when those same interests are weighed in the deportation con-
text, the individual interest should likewise prevail.0 9
165. Since the immigration law can and does provide that only healthy aliens call
enter the United States, the disease was contracted within the United Statcs, very likely
from a citizen.
166. Of course, if the alien no longer had the contagious disease, no state purpose
would be served by deportation.
167. See p. 777 supra.
168. The interest of the state of Illinois in Griffin was to avoid the expense of pro-
viding indigents with free copies of their trial transcripts.
169. This argument does not imply that resident aliens can never be deported-that the
government is powerless, for example, to deport aliens who have demonstrated
themselves to be of bad moral character through serious anti-social acts. Although
the objectives of deterring anti-social conduct and removing offenders from society coult
be accomplished through the criminal process, deportation does not rest solely on the
government interest in reducing the costs of its court and prison systems. Rather, since
such a resident alien has breached the duties and obligations which he owes the United
States, the government is no longer required to afford him protection.
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Thus, as was the case with poverty, the rationality test is not met by
the denial of naturalization to resident aliens who are diseased, even if
the diseases are contagious. The denial of citizenship would alleviate
no burden, because resident aliens are entitled to a fair share of medical




In a 1954 opinion upholding the deportation of a resident alien, who
had resided in the United States since 1918, on the grounds of past
membership in the Communist Party, Justice Frankfurter wrote:
In light of the expansion of the concept of substantive due process
as a limitation upon all powers of Congress .... much could be
said for the view, were we writing on a clean slate, that the Due
Process Clause qualifies the scope of political discretion heretofore
recognized as belonging to Congress in regulating the entry and
deportation of aliens .... But the slate is not clean. As to the extent
of the power of Congress under review, there is not merely a "page
of history;".. . but a whole volume .... [T]hat the formulation
of these policies is entrusted exclusively to Congress has become
about as firmly imbedded in the legislative and judicial tissues of
our body politic as any aspect of our government.'--
Although the doctrine of stare decisis has been central in the develop-
ment of American law, it cannot be applied mechanically when to do
so would merely perpetuate injustice and unwise judicial policy.172 The
"volume of history" of which Justice Frankfurter wrote is replete with
170. A final class of "socially burdensome" statuses which might be mentioned is
those which, even though involuntary, might be viewed as a danger to the "moral fiber"
of the nation. Two such statuses might be drunkenness and drug addiction. As noted
above, both can occur voluntarily, and when they do can be rational grounds for denying
naturalization on the basis of poor moral character. Even when the) occur involuntarily,
however, some might view them as a danger to the community. Specifically, some might
contend that a drunkard or addict, even if his status is involuntary, might have an ad-
verse moral impact on society by inducing others, through his example, to voluntarily
acquire his status. Once again the focus is deportation, since it is clearly residence,
rather than citizenship, which creates the burden.
Employing the interest test, it would seem that the government's interest in deporting
a resident alien to avoid the possibility that, through his involuntary example, he might
induce others to acquire his status is minimal, for presumably he has a right to volun.
tarily urge upon others the pleasures of his status. That is, since an addict, for example,
would have a first amendment right to inform others that it "feels good to be high."
the government loses little when it is unable to deport him for communicating the same
message by "looking like he feels good" when he is high. And, to the extent that the
state does deem it important to prevent such communication, it could simply treat the
alien's condition as it does those of its citizens.
171. Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522, 530-1 (1954).
172. Cf. Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375 (1970).
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instances in which the most important interests of resident aliens have
been abridged without so much as an inquiry as to the existence of rea-
sonable governmental justification. In light of the equivalency in duties
and obligations between citizens and resident aliens, and in light of
Schneider v. Rusk, the policy justifications on which the volume rests
are not viable. The courts should close it, and begin to apply normal
standards of constitutional adjudication in naturalization and depor.
tation cases. In doing so, they would necessarily invalidate substantial
portions of the current naturalization statute and strike down the
reported administrative abuses which the doctrine of unfettered power
has fostered.
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